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Competitive Equilibrium in Markets for VotesAlessandra CasellaColumbia University, National Bureau of Economic Research, and
Centre for Economic Policy Research
Aniol Llorente-Saguer
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Thomas R. Palfrey
California Institute of TechnologyWe develop a competitive equilibrium theory of a market for votes. Be-
fore voting on a binary issue, individuals may buy and sell their votes
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© 2012with each other. We define the concept of ex ante vote-trading equilib-
rium and show by construction that an equilibrium exists. The equilib-
rium we characterize always results in dictatorship if there is any trade,
and themarket for votes generates welfare losses, relative to simplema-
jority voting, if the committee is large enough or the distribution of val-
ues is not very skewed. We test the theoretical implications in the labo-
ratory using a continuous open-book multiunit double auction.ntroductionWhen confronted with the choice between two alternatives, groups, com-
mittees, and legislatures typically rely on majority rule. They do so for
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good reasons: as shown by May (1952), in binary choices, majority rule is
the unique anonymous, neutral, andmonotonic rule. In addition,major-
594 journal of political economyity rule creates incentives for sincere voting: in environments with private
values, it does so regardless of the information that voters have about
others’ preferences or voting strategies. A long tradition in political the-
ory analyzes conditions under which majority voting over binary choices
yields optimal public decisions or has other desirable properties.1
It has long been realized, however, that majority rule has an obvious
weakness: it fails to reflect intensity of preferences, and an almost indif-
ferentmajority will always prevail over an intenseminority. Political scien-
tists and economists have conjectured that a solution could come from
letting votes be freely traded, as if they were commodities. Just as markets
allocate goods in a way that reflects preferences, vote markets may allow
voters who care more about the decision to buy more votes (and hence
more influence), compensating other voters with money transfers (see,
e.g., Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Coleman 1966; Haefele 1971; Mueller
1973; Philipson and Snyder 1996; Parisi 2003).Whether this could lead to
preferable outcomes remains debated. Even ignoring other critiques on
distributional and philosophical grounds, scholars have recognized that
in the absence of full Coasian bargains, vote trading imposes externalities
on third parties. Riker and Brams (1973), for instance, present examples
in which exchanges of votes across issues are profitable to the pair of vot-
ers involved, and yet the committee obtains a Pareto-inferior outcome.
McKelvey and Ordeshook (1980) test the hypothesis with experimental
data and conclude that the examples are not just theoretical curiosities
but can actually be observed in the laboratory.
To this date, there is no theoretical work that clearly identifies when we
should expect vote-trading inefficiencies to arise in general and when in-
stead more positive results might emerge. There is no general model of
decentralized trade in vote markets, and central questions about equilib-
rium allocations when voters can exchange votes with each other remain
unanswered.
This article seeks to answer, in the context of a relatively simple environ-
ment, two fundamental questions about vote trading in committees oper-
ating under majority rule. First, from a positive standpoint, what alloca-
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tions and outcomes will arise in a competitive equilibrium in which votes
can be freely exchanged for a numeraire commodity? Second, what are
competitive equilibrium in markets for votes 595the welfare implications of these equilibrium outcomes, compared to a
purely democraticmajority rule institution in which buying and selling of
votes are not possible?2
To answer these questions, we develop a competitive equilibriummodel
of vote markets in which members of a committee buy and sell votes
among themselves in exchange for money. The committee decides on a
binary issue in two stages. In the first stage, members participate in a per-
fectly competitive vote market; in the second stage, all members cast their
vote(s) for their favorite alternative, and the committee decision is made
by majority rule.
A market for votes has several characteristics that distinguish it from
neoclassical environments. First, the commodities being traded (votes) are
indivisible. Second, these commodities have no intrinsic value. Third, be-
cause the votes held by one voter can affect the payoffs to other voters, vote
markets bear some similarity to markets for commodities with externali-
ties: demands are interdependent, and an agent’s own demand is a func-
tionof not only the price but also the demands of other voters. Fourth, pay-
offs are discontinuous at the points at which majority changes, and at this
point many voters may be pivotal simultaneously.
These distinctive properties create a major theoretical obstacle to un-
derstanding vote trading. In the standard competitivemodel of exchange,
equilibrium, as well as other standard concepts such as the core, typically
fails to exist (Park 1967; Kadane 1972; Bernholtz 1973, 1974; Ferejohn
1974; Schwartz 1977, 1981; Shubik and Van derHeyden 1978;Weiss 1988;
Piketty 1994; Philipson and Snyder 1996). The following simple example
illustrates both the potential inefficiency of majority rule and the problem
of nonexistence of equilibrium. Suppose that the two alternatives are M
and E and there are three voters: Maud and Mary, who prefer M over
E, and Eve, who prefers E overM. The three voters have different inten-
sities of preferences, which we represent in terms of valuations or willing-
ness to pay. Maud’s valuations for M and E are 10 and 0, respectively;
Mary’s valuations forM and E are 12 and 0, respectively; Eve’s valuations
for M and E are 0 and 30, respectively. Thus majority rule leads to deci-
sion M, but from a utilitarian point of view, E is the efficient decision.
If it were possible to exchange votes formoney, then vote trading could
in principle lead to a Pareto improvement. For example, Eve could buy
2 These issues apply more broadly than just to committee decision making and the polit-
ical process. For example, corporationsmake key decisions by shareholder votes. These votes
can be exchanged in open competitive asset markets. The connection between shareholder
voting and the trading of voting shares in competitive asset markets is emerging as an impor-
tant issue in the study of corporate governance and corporate control. See, e.g., Demichelis
and Ritzberger (2007) and Dhillon and Rossetto (2011) and the references they cite.
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both of the other votes for a price of 13 for each vote.However, as pointed
out at least as early as Ferejohn (1974) (or, more recently, Philipson and
596 journal of political economySnyder [1996]), nonexistence of a market-clearing equilibrium price is a
serious and robust problem. At any positive price, Eve demands at most
one vote: any positive price supporting a vote allocation in which either
side hasmore than two votes cannot be an equilibrium; one vote is redun-
dant, and so at any positive price there is excess supply. Eve could buy
Maud’s vote at a price of 11. But again the market will not clear: Mary’s
vote is worth nothing and Mary would be willing to sell it for less than
11. In fact, any positive price supporting Eve’s purchase of one vote can-
not be an equilibrium: the losing vote is worthless and would be put up
for sale at any positive price. But a price of 0 cannot be an equilibrium
either: at 0 price, Eve always demands a vote, and there is excess demand.
Finally, any positive price supporting no trade cannot be an equilibrium:
if the price is at least as high as Eve’s high valuation, bothMaud andMary
prefer to sell, and again there is excess supply; if the price is lower than
Eve’s valuation, Eve prefers to buy and there is excess demand.3
Other researchers have conjectured, plausibly, that nonexistence arises
in this example because the direction of preferences is known, and hence
losing votes are easily identified and worthless (Piketty 1994). According
to this view, the problem should not occur if voters are uncertain about
other voters’ preferences. But in fact nonexistence is still a problem. In
our example, suppose that Eve, Maud, and Mary each know their own
preferences but do not know the preferences of the other two: they know
only that each of the other two is equally likely to prefer either alternative.
A positive price supporting an allocation of votes such that all votes are
concentrated in the hands of one of them still cannot be an equilibrium:
as in the discussion above, one vote is redundant, and the voter would
prefer to sell it. But any positive price supporting an allocation in which
one individual holds two votes cannot be an equilibrium either: that in-
dividual holds the majority of votes and thus dictates the outcome; the
remaining vote is worthless and would be put up for sale. Finally, a price
supporting an allocation in which Eve, Maud, and Mary each hold one
vote cannot be an equilibrium. By buying an extra vote, each of them can
increase the probability of obtaining the desired alternative from three-
fourths (the probability that at least one of the other two agrees with her)
to one; by selling her vote, each decreases such a probability from three-
fourths to one-half (the probability that the two-vote individual agrees).
Recall that Eve’s preferences are the most intense and Maud’s the weak-
est. If the price is lower than one-fourth of Eve’s high valuation, Eve pre-
3 Koford (1982) and Philipson and Snyder (1996) circumvent the problem of nonexis-
tence by formulating models with centralized markets and a market maker. Both papers ar-
gue that vote markets are generally beneficial.
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fers to buy; if the price is higher than one-fourth of Maud’s low valuation,
Maud prefers to sell. The result must be either excess demand or excess
competitive equilibrium in markets for votes 597supply or both, in all cases an imbalance. These examples are robust:
nonexistence is a serious problem for the standard competitive equili-
brium approach to vote markets.
In this paper, we respond to these challenges by modifying the stan-
dard competitive model in a natural way. Specifically, we propose a no-
tion of equilibrium that we call ex ante competitive equilibrium. As in the
competitive equilibrium of an exchange economy with externalities, we
require voters to form demands taking as fixed the equilibrium price and
other voters’ demands. To solve the nonconvexity problem, we allow for
mixed—that is, probabilistic—demands.4 This introduces the possibility
that markets will not clear exactly. Thus, instead of requiring that supply
equals demand in equilibrium with probability one, in the ex ante com-
petitive equilibrium we require market clearing in expectation. Ex post,
the market is cleared through a rationing rule. The central point is that
deviations frommarket clearing, although possible ex post, cannot be sys-
tematic: they have zero mean and are unpredictable. It is a minimum re-
quirement that still ties the price and the allocations to the powerful dis-
cipline of market equilibrium while allowing the probabilistic demands
that overcome the existence problem.5
Returning to the Maud, Mary, and Eve example with privately known
direction of preference illustrates how our approach works. In that exam-
ple, there is a unique ex ante competitive equilibrium with trade: Maud
supplies her one vote, Eve demands one vote, and Mary mixes 50/50 be-
tween supplying one vote and demanding one vote. The equilibrium
price is 3.6 Expected supply and expected demand are both equal to
three-halves. Realized demand, however, is stochastic. With probability
one-half, Maud and Mary both supply one vote and Eve demands one
vote, and with probability one-half, Mary and Eve both demand one vote
while Maud supplies one vote. With an anonymous rationing rule, either
4 Making votes continuously divisible does not solve the nonconvexity problem because
there always remains a discontinuity at the point at which one trader holds half the votes.5 Kultti and Salonen (2005) also propose overcoming equilibrium existence problems in
a market for votes by allowing for mixed demands but without imposing any notion of mar-
ket balance. In their model, as in ours, the number of voters is finite, there is aggregate un-
certainty, and the market does not clear ex post. Other general equilibrium models have
usedmixed demands, e.g., Prescott and Townsend (1984). However, in their paper, markets
clear exactly, even with mixed demands, because there is a continuum of agents and no ag-
gregate uncertainty. Equilibria with mixed strategies and rationing are common in the lit-
erature on Bertrand competition with capacity constraints (e.g., Gertner 1985; Maskin
1986).
6 For this example, the equilibrium strategies are the same if the direction of preference
is common knowledge but the equilibrium price is 6 instead of 3. Generally both the equi-
libriumprice and the equilibrium strategies will bemore complicated when the direction of
preference is common knowledge. See Casella, Palfrey, and Turban (2012) for further dis-
cussion and examples.
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Maud or Mary sells a vote to Eve in the first case, and either Mary or Eve
buys a vote from Maud in the second case. It is straightforward to verify
598 journal of political economythat with anonymous rationing all voters are optimizing.
In our model individuals have privately known preferences, and we
prove,byconstruction, theexistenceof anexante competitiveequilibrium.
The equilibrium we characterize has a striking property: as in the exam-
ple, whenever there is trade, there is a dictator; that is, when the market
closes, one voter owns ðn1 1Þ=2 votes. For any committee size, the dicta-
tor must be one of the two individuals with the most intense preferences.
When the number of voters is small and the discrepancy between the
highest valuations and all others is large, the market for votes may in-
crease expected welfare. But if the discrepancy is not large, expected wel-
faremay fall. One can see this clearly in the example: the equilibriumdoes
not change if we lower Eve’s valuation from 30 to, say, 15, at which point
the market outcome is inefficient. The condition for efficiency gains be-
comes increasingly restrictive as the number of voters rises. Indeed, if val-
uations are independent of the direction of preferences, we prove that the
market must be less efficient than simple majority voting without a vote
market (i.e., no trade) if the number of voters is sufficiently large.
We test our theoretical results in an experiment by implementing the
market in a laboratory with a continuous open-book multiunit double
auction. For several decades there have been hundreds of experiments
on competitive markets and many experiments on voting in committees.
The experiment we conduct is the first study we are aware of that brings
together these disparate strands of the experimental literature. Because
vote markets are so different from standard markets, this required some
innovations to the standard computerized market trading environment.
The transaction prices we observe are higher than the ex ante compet-
itive equilibrium prices but fall with experience and converge to values
that for most treatments are consistent with our theoretical predictions
in the presence of some risk aversion. The overpricing is more noticeable
in largermarkets, possiblymirroring themore complex environment sub-
jects face and thedifficulty in acquiring a large enoughnumber of votes to
hold a majority stake in a relatively short period of trading time. The fre-
quency of dictatorship is lower than predicted but increases significantly
with experience, reaching 80 percent in small markets and late trials. Re-
markably, after the long years of disagreement in the literature, the empir-
ical efficiency of our laboratory markets tracks the theory very closely.
Two other strands of literature are not directly related to the present
article but should be mentioned. First, there is the important but differ-
ent literature on vote markets in which candidates or lobbies buy voters’
or legislators’ votes: for example, Myerson (1993), Groseclose and Snyder
(1996), Dal Bo´ (2007), and Dekel, Jackson, and Wolinsky (2008, 2009).This content downloaded  on Thu, 13 Dec 2012 11:28:06 AM
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These papers differ from our study because in our case vote trading hap-
pens within the committee (or the electorate). The individuals buying
competitive equilibrium in markets for votes 599votes are members, not external traders, groups, or parties. Second, vote
markets are not the only remedy advocated for majority rule’s failure to
recognize intensity of preferences in binary decisions. The mechanism
design literature has proposed mechanisms with side payments, build-
ing on Groves-Clarke taxes (e.g., d’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet 1979).
However, these mechanisms have problems with bankruptcy, individual
rationality, and/or budget balance (Green andLaffont 1979;Mailath and
Postlewaite 1990). A more recent literature has suggested alternative vot-
ing rules without transfers. Casella (2005), Jackson and Sonnenschein
(2007), and Hortala-Vallve (2012) propose mechanisms whereby agents
can effectively reflect their relative intensities and improve over major-
ity rule by linking decisions across issues. Casella, Gelman, and Palfrey
(2006), Casella, Palfrey, and Riezman (2008), Hortala-Vallve and Llorente-
Saguer (2010), and Engelmann and Grimm (2012) test the performance
of these mechanisms experimentally and find that efficiency levels are very
close to theoretical equilibrium predictions, even in the presence of some
deviations from theoretical equilibrium strategies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II.A defines the
basic setup of our model. Section II.B introduces the notion of ex ante
competitive equilibrium and presents the rationing rule. Section II.C
shows existence by characterizing an equilibrium. Section II.D compares
welfare obtained in equilibrium to simplemajority rule without trade.We
then turn to the experimental part. Section III describes the design of the
experiment, and Section IV describes the experimental results. Section V
presents conclusions, and the appendixes contain detailed proofs and
the experimental instructions.II. The ModelA. Setup
Because we define a new equilibrium concept, we present it in a gen-
eral setting. Some of the parameters will be specialized in our analysis
and in the experiment. Consider a committee of n voters, n odd, decid-
ing on a single binary issue through a two-stage procedure. Each voter i
is endowed with an amount mi of the numeraire and with wi ∈Z indi-
visible votes, where Z is the set of integers. Both m5 ðm1; : : :; mnÞ and
w5 ðw1; : : :; wnÞ are common knowledge. In the first stage, voters can
buy votes from each other using the numeraire; in the second stage,
voters cast their vote(s), if any, for one of the two alternatives, and a commit-
tee decision, C, is made according to themajority of votes cast. ThemodelThis content downloaded  on Thu, 13 Dec 2012 11:28:06 AM
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of exchange focuses on the first stage, and we simply assume that in the
second stage voters vote for their favorite alternative.7
600 journal of political economyThe two alternatives are denoted by A5fa; bg, and voter i ’s favorite
alternative, ai ∈A, is privately known. For each i the probability that ai5
a is equal to hi and h5 ðh1; : : :; hnÞ is common knowledge. Let Si5 fs ∈
Z ≥ 2wig be the set of possible demands of each agent.8 That is, agent i
can offer to sell some or all of his votes, do nothing, or demand any pos-
itive number of votes. The set of actions of voter i is the set of probability
measures on Si , denoted oi . We write S5 S1    Sn and let o5o1   
on. Elements of o are of the form qj : S→R, where os ∈ SqjðsÞ5 1 and
qjðsÞ ≥ 0 for all s ∈ S .
We allow for an equilibrium in mixed strategies in which, ex post, the
aggregate numbers of votes demanded and of votes offered need not co-
incide. A rationing rule R maps the profile of voters’ demands to a feasible
allocation of votes. We denote the set of feasible vote allocations by X 5
fx ∈Zn1 joxi5owig. Formally, a rationing rule R is a function from real-
ized demand profiles to the set of probability distributions over vote allo-
cations:R : S→DX , where xi ∈ ½minðwi ; wi1 siÞ; maxðwi ; wi1 siÞ for all i
and RðsÞ5w1 s if osi50. Hence, a rationing rule must fulfill several
conditions: (a) R cannot assign fewer (more) votes than the initial en-
dowment if the demand is positive (negative); (b) R cannot assign more
(fewer) votes than the initial endowment plus the demand if the demand
is positive (negative); and (c) if aggregate demand and aggregate supply
of votes coincide, then all agents’ demands are satisfied.
The particular (mixed) action profile, j ∈o, and the rationing rule,
R , jointly imply a probability distribution over the set of final vote alloca-
tions that we denote as rj;RðxÞ. In addition, for every possible allocation we
define the probability that the committee decision coincides with voter
i ’s favorite alternative, a probability we denote by Jx;ai ;h :5PrðC 5 ai jx;
hÞ, where x ∈X is the vote allocation and a ∈A.
Finally, we define voters’ preferences. The preferences of voter i are rep-
resented by a von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function ui , a concave
function of theargument vi1C5ai1mi2 ðxi2wiÞp,where vi ∈ ½v; v¯  (v ≥ 0,
v¯ finite)is a privately known valuation earned if the committee decision
C coincides with the voter’s preferred alternative ai , 1x is the indicator
function,mi is i ’s endowment of the numeraire, ðxi2wiÞ is i ’s net demand
for votes, and p is the transaction price per vote.
We can now defineU iðj; R; pÞ, the ex ante utility of voter i given some
action profile, the rationing rule, and a vote price p :
7 Equivalently, we could model a two-stage game and focus on weakly undominated strat-
egies.
8 Negative demands correspond to supply.
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U iðj; R ; pÞ5 o
x ∈ X
rj;RðxÞ½Jx;ai ;h  uiðvi1mi2 ðxi2wiÞpÞ
competitive equilibrium in markets for votes 6011 ð12Jx;ai ;hÞ  uiðmi2 ðxi2wiÞpÞ:
One can see in the formula that the uncertainty about the final outcome
depends on three factors: (a) the action profile, (b) the rationing rule,
and (c) the preferences of other voters.
B. Ex Ante Competitive EquilibriumDefinition 1. The set of actions j* and the price p* constitute an ex
ante competitive equilibrium relative to rationing rule R if the following con-
ditions are satisfied:
1. Utility maximization: For each agent i, j*i satisfies
j*i ∈ argmax
ji ∈oi
U iðji ; j*2i ; R ; p*Þ:
2. Expectedmarket clearing: In expectation, themarket clears, that is,
o
s ∈ S
qj*ðsÞo
n
i51
si50:
The definition of the equilibrium shares some features of competitive
equilibrium with externalities (e.g., Arrow and Hahn 1971, 132–36). Op-
timal demands are interrelated, and thus equilibrium requires voters to
best reply to the demands of other voters. In contrast, the standard no-
tion of competitive equilibrium requires agents to best respond only to
the price. The difference between the ex ante competitive equilibrium
and the competitive equilibrium with externalities is that the former no-
tion requires market clearing only in expected terms. Thus ex post mar-
ket imbalances are possible in equilibrium, but ex ante competitive equi-
librium requires that such imbalances not be systematic and predictable.
This is the important qualification. In the spirit of rational expectations
equilibria, deviations from market clearing—“errors”—are realized ex
post with positive probability, but their size and direction cannot be pre-
dicted. It is a minimal requirement that still preserves the notion of mar-
ket equilibrium as market clearing.
The fact that demand and supply do not necessarily balance is the rea-
son for the rationing rule. In general, the specification of the rationing
rule can affect the existence (or not) of the equilibrium and, if an equi-
librium exists, its properties.
The rationing rule can be interpreted as the representation of the ex
post market-clearing process in the competitive equilibrium. In the spiritThis content downloaded  on Thu, 13 Dec 2012 11:28:06 AM
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of Green’s (1980) important contribution to the theory of effective de-
mand, trade is highly decentralized, search incomplete, and rationing
602 journal of political economystochastic. Unsatisfied demand and supplymay coexist but zero out in ex-
pectation.9 In its full specification, the rationing rule would then be de-
rived endogenously, a function of the random matching of the individ-
uals in the market. A simpler take is to specify a rationing rule, as we
do here, interpreting it either as a reduced form of such a decentralized
process or as an exogenous institution. For most of this paper, we focus
on one specific anonymous rule, rationing by voter (R1), according to
which each voter either fulfills his demand (supply) completely or is ex-
cluded from trade. After voters submit their orders, demanders and sup-
pliers of votes are randomly ranked in a list, with all rankings having the
same probability. Then demands are satisfied in turn: the demand of the
first voter on the list is satisfied with the first supplier(s) on the list; then
the demand of the second voter on the list is satisfied with the first sup-
plier(s) on the list with offers still outstanding, and so on. In case some-
one’s demand cannot be satisfied, the voter is left with his initial en-
dowment, and the process goes on with the next on the list. Rule R1 is
reminiscent of all-or-nothing (AON) orders used in securities trading: the
order is executed at the specified price only if it can be executed in full.
AON orders are used when the value of the order depends on its being
executed in full: traders want to ensure that they will not be saddled with
partially filled orders of little value. It is this feature that makes R1 partic-
ularly well suited to a market for votes.10
C. EquilibriumFor the rest of the paper we assume that each voter prefers either alterna-
tive with probability one-half (hi5 0:5) and is initially endowed with one
vote (wi5 1). In addition, we assume for now that all individuals are risk
neutral and normalize the initial endowment ofmoney to zero (mi5 0 for
all i), allowing for negative consumption of the numeraire. The value of
mi plays no role with risk neutrality, and thus the restriction here is im-
posed with no loss of generality. We will return later to the assumption of
risk neutrality.
In this subsection we prove by construction the existence of an ex ante
competitive equilibrium when the rationing rule is R1.
9 The literature mentioned earlier on oligopolistic markets with capacity constraints in-
terprets rationing similarly.
10 See, e.g., the description of AON orders by the New York Stock Exchange (http://www
.nyse.com/futuresoptions/nysearcaoptions/). As a rationing rule, R1 fulfills the conditions
given in Sec. II.A but by construction makes it possible for both sides of the market to be
rationed.
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Theorem 1. Suppose that hi5
1
2,wi5 1, andmi50 for all i ; agents are
risk neutral; and R1 is the rationing rule. Voters are ordered according to
competitive equilibrium in markets for votes 603increasing valuation: v1 < v2 <   < vn. Then for all n and fv1; : : :; vng
there exists an ex ante competitive equilibriumwith positive trade. In equi-
librium, voters 1 to n2 2 offer to sell their vote with probability one; vot-
ers n2 1 and n demand ðn2 1Þ=2 votes with probabilities gn21 and gn, re-
spectively, and offer their vote otherwise. The probabilities gn21 and gn and
the equilibrium price p depend on n and the realization of fv1; : : :; vng,
but for all n and fv1; : : :; vng, p is always such that voter n2 1 is just indif-
ferent between selling his vote and demanding a majority of votes.
Proof. Follows from lemma 1 below.
The theorem establishes two results that are at the center of our con-
tribution. The first is the existence of an ex ante competitive equilibrium
with positive trade. Relaxing market balance by allowing it to hold in ex-
pectation reestablishes the existence of an equilibrium, even in the pres-
ence of all the anomalies that characterize a market for votes. Our equi-
libriumnotion thus has somebite: it suggests precise, testable predictions
that we will be able to confront with the experimental data.
Equally important, the ex ante competitive equilibrium has properties
that are economically intuitive. Because votes are valuable only when they
make their owner pivotal, the market can be loosely thought of as analo-
gous to auctioning off the right to be dictator on the issue. Thus it is not
surprising that the equilibrium price is precisely the price at which the
second-highest-valuation voter is indifferent between “winning” the dic-
tatorship and selling his vote and letting someone else be dictator. Allow-
ing for expected market balance not only reestablishes the existence of
an equilibrium with trade but leads to equilibrium strategies and a price
that reflect the special nature of a market for votes.
While theorem 1 establishes the existence of a nontrivial equilibrium
for any n and any profile of distinct valuations, two qualifications are in
order. First, the theorem applies relative to rationing rule R1. As in other
equilibrium existence results (e.g., Simon and Zame 1990), the fine de-
tails of the rationing rule can be important. While R1 seems natural and
intuitive, we do not have an existence result or a characterization for ar-
bitrary rationing rules. We do know, however, that theorem 1 has some
degree of robustness to the rationing rule. We have investigated an alter-
native anonymous rule, R2 or rationing by vote, in which each vote sup-
plied is allocated with equal probability to each voter with outstanding
unsatisfied demand. We show in Appendix B that under reasonable con-
ditions (satisfied in our laboratorymarkets), if the number of voters is not
too large, then an ex ante competitive equilibrium exists with R2. More-
over, the equilibrium we characterize is very similar under R2 and R1: the
price is such that the second-highest-value voter is indifferent betweenThis content downloaded  on Thu, 13 Dec 2012 11:28:06 AM
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demanding a majority of votes and selling his vote; all voters with lower
values offer their vote for sale, and the highest-value voter demands ama-
604 journal of political economyjority of votes. Thus, the equilibrium competition for dictatorship does
not depend on R1.
Second, trivial equilibria exist in which there is no trade: all voters de-
mand zero, and all are indifferent over all trading strategies, given the
zero-trade strategies of the other voters. A more interesting possibility is
that theremay be other equilibria with positive trade.One can easily prove
that the equilibrium characterized in theorem 1 is unique for any pro-
file of valuations when n5 3. However, we do not have a general unique-
ness result for arbitrary n.
To discuss theorem 1 further, we characterize it more precisely in
lemma 1.
Lemma 1. For all n, there exists a finite threshold mn ≥ 1 such that
if vn> mnvn21, then gn215 ðn21Þ=ðn1 1Þ, gn51, and p5 vn21=ðn1 1Þ. If
vn ≤ mnvn21, then gn21, gn, and p are the solutions to the following system:
gn5
2n
n11
2gn21; ð1Þ
p5
224f2 ð12 4fÞgn21
2ðn2 1Þ2 ðn2 3Þgn21
vn; ð2Þ
p5
224f2 ð12 4fÞgn
2ðn2 1Þ2 ðn2 3Þgn
vn21; ð3Þ
gn21 ∈
n2 1
n11
;
n
n11
 
; gn ∈
n
n11
; 1
h i
; ð4Þ
where
f5
n21
n21
2
!
22n:
 
Proof. In Appendix A.
We do not reproduce here the explicit equations for gn21, gn, and p be-
cause they are not particularly transparent. They are in Appendix A, to-
gether with the derivation of the threshold
mn5 ðn2 1Þðn1 5Þ ðn11Þ n1 32
n21
n21
2
!
22ðn23Þ
 #" )21
:
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But the logic of the equilibrium is quite clear. Positive demand for votes
comes only from the two voters at the upper end of the valuation distribu-
competitive equilibrium in markets for votes 605tion. The equilibrium price, together with the two voters’ randomization
probabilities, depends exclusively on n and on the realization of vn and
vn21. If vn is sufficiently large relative to vn21, the price that leaves voter
n2 1 indifferent between offering his vote for sale and demanding a ma-
jority of the votes is low enough to guarantee that voter n strictly prefers
demanding a majority of the votes himself rather than selling. In such a
case, voter n21 is the only one randomizing: voter n demands a majority
of votes with probability one (gn51), and all others offer their vote for
sale. The price is simply p5 vn21=ðn1 1Þ. If instead vn and vn21 are close
enough, then it is possible for both voter n and voter n2 1 to randomize
between selling their vote and demanding amajority. The randomization
probabilities and the price must satisfy expected market balance (1) and
the indifference conditions for both voters, (2) and (3). For vn and vn21 in
this range, both the price p and gn are increasing in vn=vn21 while gn21 is
decreasing.11
The threshold mn depends on n, but the relationship is not obvious: the
size of the electorate influences the equilibrium price, the number of
votes that must be purchased to achieve a majority, the expected market
balance condition, and the probability of obtaining one’s favorite out-
come in the absence of trade. All four factors affect mn. The threshold mn
is always close to one: mn5 1 at n5 3, it increases to a maximum of 1.03
at n5 7, and it declines thereafter, rapidly converging to one as n gets
large.
Notice, for clarity, that individual voters are not assumed to know
others’ values. It is only in equilibrium that the identity of the two
highest-value voters is revealed by their best-response strategies, given the
price and others’ strategies.
Three observations follow from lemma 1. First of all, the only actions
selected with positive probability are either selling or demanding enough
votes to hold a majority. Because of the importance of pivotality, the de-
mand for votes is positive only when it concerns the full package of votes
necessary to acquire the right to dictatorship.
The second observation then follows immediately: in the equilibrium
described in the lemma, any vote market outcome in which trade occurs
always results in dictatorship. The equilibrium does not induce dictator-
ship only when (1) vn <mnvn21 and both voter n and voter n2 1 random-
ize between selling and demanding a majority of votes, and (2) the real-
ized action for both is to sell. In such a case, every voter on the market11 Note that at higher p, the indifference of vn21 requires higher gn : the probability of be-
ing rationed when demanding must be higher.
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offers to sell; there is no trade, and the decision is made through simple
majority. But such an outcome is both infrequent—its probability is
606 journal of political economybounded above by 1=ðn1 1Þ2—and not very interesting—it arises from
the failure to have any trade. In all other cases, after rationing, either voter
n or voter n2 1 will have a majority of votes. A market for votes does not
distribute votes somewhat equally among high-valuation individuals: if
any trade occurs, our ex ante competitive equilibrium concentrates all
decision power in the hands of a single voter.
Third, rationing occurs with probability one: there is always either
excess demand for or excess supply of votes. The larger the commit-
tee size, the closer to one the probability that both voter n and voter
n21 demand votes and, thus, thehigher theprobability of positive excess
demand. In the limit, for electorates whose size is unbounded, demand
exceeds supply by one vote with probability approaching one. Relative to
the amounts traded, the imbalance is of order 1=n and thus is negligible
in volume, recalling analyses of competitive equilibria with nonconvex-
ities (in particular the notion of approximate equilibrium, where in large
economies allocations approach demands; see, e.g., Starr 1969; Arrow
and Hahn 1971). But, contrary to private-goods markets, in our market
the imbalance is never negligible in its impact on welfare: it always trig-
gers rationing and shuts ðn2 1Þ=2 voters out of the market.D. WelfareWhenever there is trade, in the equilibrium characterized by theorem 1,
decision power is concentrated in the hands of a single voter. And be-
cause the probability of trade itself is bounded below by 12 1=ðn1 1Þ2,
the probability of dictatorship is always close to one and converges to one
at large n. It is true that the dictator will be one of the two highest-value
voters, but concentrating all decision power in the hands of a single agent
does not bode well for the ex ante welfare properties of the institution. In
this subsection we compare the welfare obtained in the ex ante compet-
itive equilibrium to a situation without a market, where voters simply cast
their votes for their favorite alternative. Our main result is that if n is suf-
ficiently large, the vote market must be inefficient relative to themajority
rule outcome with no trade.
CallWMR ex ante expected utility in the absence of trade (under major-
ity rule) andWVM ex ante expected utility with the vote market, both eval-
uated before individual valuations are realized. Denote by FnðvÞ with v5
ðv1; : : :; vnÞ the joint probability distributionof the vectorof valuations.We
assume that the density function fnðvÞ exists, is continuously differentia-
ble, and is everywhere strictly positive on ½ v; v¯ n, with v> 0. We can writeThis content downloaded  on Thu, 13 Dec 2012 11:28:06 AM
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and the notation makes explicit the dependence of probabilities gn and
gn21 on vn and vn21. Equation (5) is transparent: if majority rule is imple-
mented, ex ante expected utility is defined by the average valuation and
by the probability of being pivotal, always strictly higher than one-half.
These are, respectively, the first and second expressions inside the inte-
grals. Ex ante expected utility with the vote market is defined in equa-
tion (6). The three terms inside the integrals correspond to ex ante
per capita utility in the three possible scenarios: dictatorship by voter n,
dictatorship by voter n2 1, and lack of trade, in each case weighted by
the corresponding probability. In the first two cases, expected utility
equals half the expected average valuation of nondictators plus the full
valuation of the dictator. In the third case, the outcome is dictated by ma-
jority rule. Because the probabilities gn and gn21 depend on vn and vn21,
the expression cannot be simplified. But the complication is a matter of
notation only. We can establish the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Consider a sequence of vote markets, indexed by
the size of the electorate n. For any sequence of distribution functions
fFng, there exists a finite n¯ such that if n> n¯, Wn;MR >Wn;VM .This content downloaded  on Thu, 13 Dec 2012 11:28:06 AM
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Proof. To simplify notation, we now write gnðvn; vn21Þ as gn, and simi-
larly for g . From v ≥ v ,
608 journal of political economyn21 n n21
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while for any Fn such that every random variable vi has bound positive sup-
port, vn=ðv11   1 vnÞ=n is always finite.12 Hence,
12 Stirling’s approximation for factorial terms states that at large n,n!5nne2n
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2pn
p ½11Oð1=nÞ:
Thus at large n,
2nð22nÞ
n21
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!
2
2nﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
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But limn→` 2n=
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2pðn21Þp 5`, and thus
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n→`
2nð22nÞ
n21
n21
2
!
5`:
 
We are using here the assumption v> 0. Weaker conditions would be sufficient too (e.g.,
v> 0 for a positive but arbitrarily small fraction of voters). No requirement that v be strictly
positive is necessary at all if we constrain the valuation draws to be independent and iden-
tically distributed.
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if 12 ð12gnÞð12gn21Þ> 0 for all n. But, from lemma 1, 12 ð12gnÞð12
gn21Þ ≥ 12 1=ðn1 1Þ2 for all n. Hence (8) holds for any realization of val-
ues and thus must hold in expectation:
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The functions Wn;VM and Wn;MR are continuous in n, and thus there must
exist a number n¯ such that if n> n¯, Wn;VM <Wn;MR . QED
Why does the vote market fare worse, in ex ante welfare terms, than
simple majority? The intuition is simple and clarifies the mechanisms of
the model. With a market for votes, when trade occurs, a voter’s equilib-
rium ex ante probability of obtaining his preferred alternative is one if he
is dictator and one-half if he is not (the probability that the dictator will
agree with him). Because ex ante the probability of being dictator is of
order 1=n, the total probability is one-half plus a term of order 1=n. With-
out trade, the corresponding probability is one-half plus the probability
of being pivotal, which in this model is of order 1=
ﬃﬃﬃ
n
p
in large electorates.
Although in both cases the probability of obtaining one’s preferred alter-
native decreases with n and tends to one-half asymptotically, the speed ofThis content downloaded  on Thu, 13 Dec 2012 11:28:06 AM
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convergence is slower with simple majority voting: as the proposition
states, there is always an electorate size large enough that simplemajority
610 journal of political economyvoting with no trade leads to higher ex ante utility than the market for
votes.13
At a large enough size of the electorate, as the proposition states, the
conclusion holds for any distribution F. In small electorates, the welfare
properties of the market for votes must depend on the correlation of
valuations across voters and on the shape of F : the larger the expected
disparity between the highest expected valuation (or the two highest)
and all others, the less costly the concentration of votes brought by the
market. Notice, however, that for the market to bring welfare gains,
such disparity must be pronounced enough. Suppose, for example,
that valuations were independent draws from a uniform distribution on
[0, 1]. Then the expected highest draw vn is twice the expected average of
all other draws and 2n=ðn2 1Þ times the average of valuations v1 to vn22.
And yet the market leads to a decline in expected welfare, as seen in the
next proposition.
Proposition 2. Suppose that ðv1; : : :; vnÞ are independent draws
from a uniform distribution with support [0, 1]. Then, for all n,WMR >WVM .
Proof. In Appendix A.
The larger the number of voters, the larger the expected cost of dicta-
torship, and the more skewed the distribution of valuations must be for
themarket to be efficiency enhancing. The result is illustrated in figure 1.
The figure plots the area in which the vote market dominates majority
rule (dark gray) and the area in which the reverse is true (light gray). The
vertical axis is the ratio of the second to the highest valuation, vn21=vn, and
the horizontal axis is the ratio of the average of valuations v1 to vn22 to the
highest valuation, a ratio we call v¯ n22=vn. The figure has four panels,
corresponding to n5 5, 9, 51, and 501. The two cases n5 5 and n59 are
the committee sizes we study in the experiment, and the symbols in the
figures correspond to the experimental valuations’ profiles we discuss in
the next section. At n5 501, the votemarket dominatesmajority rule only
if the highest valuation is at a minimum about 20 times as high as the av-
erage of valuations v1 to vn22.
The welfare analysis, logically straightforward given theorem 1, contra-
dicts common intuitions about votemarkets. In the absence of budget in-
equalities and common values, a market for votes is often believed to
13 We thank Laurent Bouton for this intuition. In our model the probability of favoring
either alternative is independent of a voter’s valuation. If asymmetries between the support-
ers of the two alternatives were introduced, the result might change, but the equilibrium of
the vote market would need to be rederived. Casella et al. (2012) present an example in
which the groups supporting either alternative have known and different sizes. The superi-
ority of majority voting is confirmed, both theoretically and experimentally.
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dominate simple majority rule because it is expected to redistribute vot
ing power from low-intensity voters to high-intensity voters (see, e.g.
FIG. 1.—Welfare graphs. The graphs show the area in whichmajority rule dominates vote
markets (light gray) and the area in which votemarkets dominate majority rule (dark gray)
The symbols corresponds to different experimental treatments: triangle,HB; diamond,HT
square, LB; and circle, LT.
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This content downloaded  on Thu, 13 Dec 2012 11:28:06 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions-
,
.
;Piketty 1994). Although such a redistribution is confirmed in the ex ante
competitive equilibrium we characterize, it occurs in extreme fashion:
the efficiency conjecture generally fails because all decision power is con-
centrated in the hands of a single individual.
III. Experimental Design
612 journal of political economyA model of vote markets is difficult to test with existing data: actual vote
trading is generally not available in the public record and in most cases is
prohibited. Wemust turn to the economics laboratory. Exactly how to do
this, however, is not obvious. Like most competitive equilibrium theories,
ourmodeling approach abstracts from the exact details of a tradingmech-
anism. Rather than specifying an exact game form, the model is premised
on the less precise assumption that under sufficiently competitive forces
the equilibrium price will emerge following the law of supply and demand.
But because of the nature of votes, a votemarket differs substantially from
traditional competitivemarkets, and our equilibrium concept is nonstan-
dard.Does this new competitive equilibriumconcept applied to thediffer-
ent voting environment have any predictive value?Will a laboratory exper-
iment organized in a similar way to standard laboratory markets (Smith
1965) lead to prices, allocations, and comparative statics in accord with ex
ante competitive equilibrium? These are the main questions we address in
this and the next section.
Experiments were conducted at the Social Sciences and Economics
Laboratory at Caltech during June 2009, with Caltech students from dif-
ferent disciplines. Eight sessions were run in total, four of them with five
subjects and four with nine. No subject participated inmore than one ses-
sion. All interactions among subjects were computerized, using an exten-
sion of the open-source software package Multistage.14
The voters in an experimental session constituted a committee whose
charge was to decide, through voting, on a binary outcome, X or Y. Each
voter was randomly assigned to be either in favor of X or in favor of Y
with equal probability and was given a valuation that she or he would
earn if the voter’s preferred outcome was the committee decision. Voters
knew that others would also prefer either X or Y with equal probability
and that they were assigned valuations, different for each voter, belong-
ing to the range [1, 1,000] but did not know either others’ preferred out-
come or the realizations of valuations, nor were they given any informa-
tion on the distribution of valuations.
All voters were endowed with one vote. After being told their own pri-
vate valuation and their own preferred outcome, but before voting, there
was a 2-minute trading stage during which voters had the opportunity to
buy or sell votes. After the trading stage, the process moved to the voting
stage, where the decision was made by majority rule. At this stage, voters
simply cast all their votes, which were automatically counted in favor of
their preferred outcome. Once all voters had voted, the results were re-
ported back to everyone on the committee, and the information was dis-
14 Documentation and instructions for downloading the software can be found at http://
software.ssel.caltech.edu.This content downloaded  on Thu, 13 Dec 2012 11:28:06 AM
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played in a history table on their computer screens, viewable throughout
the experiment.
competitive equilibrium in markets for votes 613We designed the trading mechanism as a continuous double auction,
following closely the experimental studies of competitive markets for pri-
vate goods and assets (see, e.g., Forsythe, Palfrey, and Plott 1982; Smith
1982; Gray and Plott 1990; Davis and Holt 1992). At any time during the
trading period, any committee member could post a bid or an offer for
one ormultiple votes. Bid and offer prices (per vote) could be any integer
in the range from one to 1,000. New bids or offers did not cancel any out-
standing ones, if there were any. All active bids or offers could be accepted,
and this information was immediately updated on the computer screens
of all voters. As with themodel’s rationing rule R1, a bid or offer formore
than one unit was not transacted until the entire order had been filled.
However, active bids or offers that had not been fully transacted could
be canceled at any time by the voter who placed the order. The number
of votes that different voters of the committee held was displayed in real
time on each voter’s computer screen and updated with every transac-
tion. There were two additional trading rules. At the beginning of the ex-
periment, voters were loaned an initial amount of cash of 10,000 points,
and their cash holdings were updated after each transaction and at the
end of the voting stage. If their cash holdings ever became 0 or negative,
they could not place any bid or accept any offer until their balance be-
came positive again.15 Second, voters could not sell votes if they did not
have any or if all the votes they owned were committed.
Once the voting stage was concluded, the procedure was repeated with
the direction of preference shuffled: voters were again endowed with a
single vote, valuation assignments remained unchanged but the direc-
tion of preferences was reassigned randomly and independently, and a
new 2-minute trading stage started, followed by voting. We call each rep-
etition, for a given assignment of valuations, a round. After five rounds
were completed, a different set of valuations was assigned, and the game
was again repeated for five rounds. We call each set of five rounds with
fixed valuations a match. Each experimental session consisted of four
matches; that is, in each session voters were assigned four different sets
of valuations. Thus in total a session consisted of 20 rounds.
The sets of valuations were designed according to two criteria. First, we
wanted to compare market behavior and pricing with valuations that
were on average low (L) or on average high (H); second, we wanted to
compare results with valuations concentrated at the bottom of the dis-
tribution (B) and with valuations concentrated at the top (T). This sec-
ond feature was designed to test the theoretical welfare prediction: when
valuations are concentrated at the bottom, the gap between the top val-
15 The liquidity constraint was rarely binding, and bankruptcy never occurred. By the end
of the last market, all subjects had positive cash holdings after loan repayment.This content downloaded  on Thu, 13 Dec 2012 11:28:06 AM
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uations and all others is larger, and thus the vote market should perform
better, relative to majority voting. The B treatments correspond to the
614 journal of political economytriangle (HB) and square (LB) symbols in figure 1.
For either n55 or n5 9, each of the four combinations LB, LT, HB,
and HT thus corresponds to a specific set of valuations. We call each amar-
ket. The exact values are reproduced in table 1 and plotted in figure 2.16
Sessions with the same number of voters differed in the order of the
different markets, as described in table 2. Because, for given n, the equi-
librium price depends only on the second-highest valuation, HTand HB
markets (and LTand LBmarkets) have the same equilibrium price. Thus
in each session we alternated H and L markets. In addition, because we
conjectured that behavior in the experiment could be sensitive to the dis-
persion in valuations, we alternated B and T markets. With these con-
straints, four experimental sessions for each number of voters were suffi-
cient to implement all possible orders of markets.
At the beginning of each session, instructions were read by the exper-
imenter standing on a stage in the front of the trading room.17 After the
instructions were finished, the experiment began. Subjects were paid the
sum of their earnings over all 20 rounds multiplied by a predetermined
exchange rate and a show-up fee of $10, in cash, in private, immediately
following the session. Sessions lasted, on average, 1 hour and 15minutes,
and subjects’ average final earnings were $29.
IV. Experimental ResultsWe organize our discussion of the experimental results by focusing, in
turn, on prices, final vote allocations, and efficiency.
A. PricesFigure 3 shows, as an example, the realized transacted prices in one of
our markets: LT with nine voters. The horizontal axis is the number of
minutes passed since the opening of the market when the transaction
takes place; the vertical dashed lines indicate the end of a round (recall
that valuations are maintained across rounds, but the direction of pref-
erences is reassigned randomly). The different symbols correspond to
different sessions and, more importantly, to different times within a ses-
sion when the specific market was played: white circles are price realiza-
16 Thus the experiment has eight markets (four markets for each of n55 and n59). We
obtained the exact valuation numbers by choosing high values with no focal properties
(vn 5957 and vn215903 forH and vn 5753 and vn215501 for L) andderiving the remaining
valuations through the rule vi 5 vn21ði=ðn21ÞÞr (with some rounding) with r 50:75 for T
and r 52 for B.
17 The instructions are reproduced in Appendix D.
This content downloaded  on Thu, 13 Dec 2012 11:28:06 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
FIG. 2.—Experimental valuations. Graphs on the top/bottom correspond to treatment
with committee size 5/9. Black/gray graphs correspond to treatments with high/low valua
tions (H/L). Solid/dashed lines correspond to treatments with valuations concentrated on
the top/bottom (T/B).
TABLE 1
Valuations in the Different Markets
Valuation Number
Market 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
HB 14 56 127 226 353 508 691 903 957
HT 190 319 433 537 635 728 784 903 957
LB 8 31 70 125 196 282 384 501 753
LT 105 177 240 298 352 404 434 501 753
Note.—In the case of n55, only valuations 2, 4, 6, 8, and 9 were used.
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-
tions in the session in which LTwas played first and in which, therefore
subjects had no experience with the vote market game at all; light gray
TABLE 2
Orders of Different Markets
Match
Session 1 2 3 4
1 HT LB HB LT
2 LT HB LB HT
3 HB LT HT LB
4 LB HT LT HB
FIG. 3.—Prices of traded votes in the LT market with nine subjects. The horizontal line
corresponds to the equilibrium price with risk neutrality. Vertical dashed lines indicate dif
ferent rounds in a match.
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-triangles correspond to a session in which the LT market was played sec-
ond, after five rounds of experience with a different market and a differ-
ent equilibrium price; dark gray diamonds correspond to a session in
which the LTmarket was played third; and, finally, black circles corre-
spond to a session in which it was played last and in which, there-
fore, subjects had accumulated most experience, although with differ-
ent valuations. The black horizontal line is the equilibrium price, which
for an LT market with nine players corresponds to p5 50. As described
above, in this treatment the voters’ valuations ranged from 105 to 753,
with the median valuation at 352.
competitive equilibrium in markets for votes 617The figure makes two points quite clearly. First, over time, realized
prices fall toward the equilibrium price, and this occurs both for succes-
sive rounds in a given session and across sessions, as the LTmarket occurs
later in the order of treatments. Second, even though prices fall with ex-
perience, realized prices are above the equilibrium price. These two fea-
tures are common to the price data in all of our experimental markets,
and we organize our discussion around them.
1. Risk AversionOverpricing is a common finding inmarket and auction experiments, at-
tributed at least in part to the presence of risk aversion (see, e.g., Cox,
Smith, and Walker 1988; Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey 2002). The equilibri-
umprice plotted in figure 3 is the equilibrium price with risk neutrality. It
seems intuitive that the equilibrium price would be higher with risk aver-
sion because buying a majority of votes eliminates all the risk. However,
verifying such an intuition requires characterizing the ex ante competi-
tive equilibrium of the vote market in the presence of risk aversion, and
the task is complicated by the fact that the rationing rule itself creates
some risk. The following proposition establishes the result and charac-
terizes equilibrium prices for the case of constant absolute risk aversion
(CARA).
Proposition 3. Suppose that uð Þ5 2e2rð  Þ with r> 0; R1 is the ra-
tioning rule. Then for all our experimental treatments the set of strate-
gies in theorem 1 together with the price
p5
2
rðn11Þ ln
1
2
1
1
2
e rvn21
 
constitute an ex ante competitive equilibrium.
Proof. In Appendix A.
If all individuals have CARA utility functions with the same risk aver-
sion parameter, the results of theorem 1 generalize with little change. As
in the case of risk neutrality, at the equilibrium price, voter n2 1must be
indifferent between selling and demanding a majority of votes; hence
again the price is a function of vn21. As discussed in Appendix A, in all our
experimental treatments the ratio vn=vn21 is sufficiently large to support
an ex ante competitive equilibrium in which the highest-valuation voter,
voter n, demands ðn2 1Þ=2 votes with probability one. Thus in our exper-
imental parameterization, equilibrium strategies with CARA utility are
fully described by the first part of lemma 1.
As expected, the equilibrium price increases with the risk aversion pa-
rameter r. The intuition is not difficult to see. The price p must be suchThis content downloaded  on Thu, 13 Dec 2012 11:28:06 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
that voter n21 is indifferent between demanding 21 and ðn2 1Þ=2
votes. In equilibrium, the probability of being rationed is equal in both
618 journal of political economycases, but demanding21 is a riskier lottery because even if nonrationed,
the outcome depends on the preferences of voter n, who will be dictator.
Hence, with the price fixed, an increase in risk aversion makes the riskier
lottery of selling less attractive relatively to demanding amajority of votes:
in order to make voter n21 indifferent, the price must be higher. In fact
this straightforward reasoning can tell us more. The upper bound on the
price, p¯ , must correspond to an infinitely risk-averse individual, one who
puts full weight on the worse realization of the selling lottery, where voter
n has opposite preferences and the election is lost. Hence
uðp¯ Þ5u vn212 p¯ n2 12
 
;
or p¯ 52½vn21=ðn1 1Þ. The upper bound on the price must be exactly
twice the risk-neutral price.18 We can emphasize this observation in a
corollary.
Corollary 1. For any value of r > 0, p ∈ ðvn21=ðn1 1Þ; 2vn21=ðn
1 1ÞÞ.
2. Convergence toward the Equilibrium Price
Figure 4 reports plots of realized prices in all experimental markets for
both n55 and n5 9, by round and by order in a session. The two hori-
zontal lines plot the upper and lower boundaries of the equilibrium
price. The last panel reproduces figure 3.
The figure shows several regularities. First, experience matters even
across markets with different valuations: black circles are consistently
more likely to belong to the equilibrium price range than other colors
and white circles are consistently less likely to do so. Second, both within
and across rounds there is more dispersion in realized prices in n5 5
markets: the smaller number of transactions reduces the extent of learn-
ing and results in higher variability. Third, convergence toward the equi-
librium price is always from above, and in n5 9 markets it is toward the
upper boundary of the price range.19 The equilibrium price for relatively
small values of r closely approximates the upper boundary of the interval.
18 Indeed,
2 11 e rvn21
 
vn21lim
r→` rðn 1 1Þln 2 52n 1 1:
ut the result holds not only with CARA but for all concave uð  Þ.
19 Convergence from above has been observed in many other market experiments. For
xample, the early experiments on posted price mechanisms by Plott and Smith (1978) ex-
ibit convergence from above. Experiments in which buyer surplus is greater than seller sur-
lus can also lead to this direction of convergence (Smith andWilliams 1982).However, nei-
er of these features is present in the markets we study.B
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The challenge is how to formalize rigorously and test the dynamic price ad
justment that the figure suggests. Following Noussair, Plott, and Riezman
TABLE 3
Linear Regression of the Log of the Transacted Price on a Market Dummy and
the Inverse of the Time, in Seconds, since the Beginning of Each Match
pˆ*
95% Confidence
Interval [prn , p¯]
n55
(R
2
5 :42, N 5 178)
HT 242 [172, 340] [151, 302]
HB 233 [187, 293] [151, 302]
LT 162 [101, 260] [84, 168]
LB 117 [54, 255] [84, 168]
n59
(R 25 :45, N 5 435)
HT 200 [151, 268] [90, 180]
HB 196 [172, 224] [90, 180]
LT 143 [100, 202] [50, 100]
LB 136 [107, 174] [50, 100]
Note.—The time coefficients are allowed to vary across both markets and matches and
are reported in App. C. For each market, the data are clustered by session and match. Be
cause of the small number of clusters, the standard errors are estimated through a clus
ter-robust bootstrap estimator, with 2,000 repetitions (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller
2008). The regression does not include four price realizations just above zero that were ob
served after a dictator had emerged.
21 One of the two rejections is for the market depicted in fig. 3.
of the prices improves the properties of the regression residuals.
620 journal of political economy
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-(1995), we estimate logðpMmtÞ5aM1 bMmð1=tÞ1 εMmt , where t is the unit of
time in the experiment (seconds since the beginning of the match for
each transacted price in our design),M is the index for each market, and
m is the index for each match (the order in which the market is played in
the experimental session).20 Thus the parameter aM captures the asymp-
totic tendency of price logðpMÞ. The full set of parameters’ estimates is
reproduced in Appendix C (table C1); the estimates of the long-term
prices, here converted from logs into levels for ease of reading and de-
noted pˆ *, are reported in table 3. Column 3 reports the range of equilib-
rium prices, from the risk-neutral price prn to the upper boundary p¯.
The table provides a compact summary of the long-run trends of trans-
acted prices. In all n55 markets the 95 percent confidence interval for
the estimate of p* overlaps the equilibrium range; in the n5 9 markets,
the same conclusion holds for the two H treatments and is marginally re-
jected in the twoL treatments.21 Thus in six of our eight treatments we can-
not reject competitive equilibrium pricing with risk aversion.
The theory yields precise comparative statics predictions: for given n,
the prices should be higher in H markets than in L markets; and for
20 Given the dispersion in realized prices shown in the plots, a logarithmic transformation
given H or L valuations, prices should be higher in markets with five in-
dividuals than in markets with nine. The large standard errors prevent
competitive equilibrium in markets for votes 621any of the differences from being statistically significant at conventional
levels, but in seven out of eight comparisons the point estimates are in
line with the theoretical predictions.22 In addition, for given n, the price
should be equal in Tand Bmarkets, a strong prediction given that all val-
uations are different, with the exception of the two highest. The hypoth-
esis cannot be rejected, and the close proximity of the point estimates in
three out of the four cases is noteworthy.
Table 3 confirms what figure 4 suggested: relative to equilibrium pre-
dictions, prices tend to remain higher in n59 markets. Although differ-
ential risk aversion could explain some of the difference, an alternative
explanation seems to us more likely: in the experimental design, trading
was open for 2minutes in both n5 5 and n5 9markets, but it seems quite
possible that price discovery requires a longer trading period in the larger
market. We cannot exclude the hypothesis that prices remain higher in
n5 9 markets simply because the market has not converged yet.
There is a third hypothesis we can instead reject. Our equilibrium has
the somewhat unusual feature that, for any n, equilibrium demands are
positive for at most two voters. One might be skeptical about applying
competitive equilibriumprice taking in such amodel and conjecture that
what we see is the result of low competitive forces. However, that intuition
turns out to be wrong, and there is an easy way to see this. Suppose that
one views this market as a duopsony instead of a competitive market. In a
duopsony, buyers have market power, so prices should be lower than the
competitive ones. But this is not what we observe at all. We observe prices
somewhat above risk-neutral competitive equilibrium prices, so our data
clearly reject the hypothesis that the high-value voters (i.e., buyers) are
able to exercise market power. The reason in fact is straightforward.
When the vote market opens, everyone is a (potential) buyer and every-
one is a (potential) seller: all voters are competing with each other on
both sides of the market. In a monopsony or duopsony, on the contrary,
there are one or two designated buyers, and all other market participants
are designated as sellers a priori. Because voters can take either side of
the market, the vote market is similar to an asset market, where compet-
itive forces or arbitrage will prevent disequilibrium pricing.
B. Transactions and Allocations1. Transactions
Table 4 summarizes the observed trades. We distinguish between a trans-
action—a realized trade between two voters—and an order—an offer to
sell or a bid to buy votes that may or may not be realized. Note that both
22 The exception is p LB5 < p LB9.This content downloaded  on Thu, 13 Dec 2012 11:28:06 AM
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orders and transactions in principle may concern multiple votes: on the
purchasing side, it is clearly feasible to demand and buy multiple units
TABLE 4
Transactions’ Summary
Market
LB LT HB HT Average
n55
No. transactions 2.3 2.1 2.3 2.3 2.3
% unitary 83 95 96 96 92
% from offers 77 58 66 72 68
No. orders 5.8 5.8 4.4 6.8 5.7
% unitary 94 94 92 92 93
% offers 90 74 65 52 70
n59
No. transactions 5.8 5.0 5.9 5.0 5.4
% unitary 100 85 97 100 96
% from offers 77 59 83 77 74
No. orders 16.0 15.1 16.6 14.6 15.6
% unitary 98 93 95 93 95
% offers 83 67 62 62 69
when n59 (there is no systematic effect across markets). The observed lack of speculation
or other attempts to manipulate prices is in line with our modeling of the market as com
petitive, even with the small number of traders in the market.
24 By allowing multiunit orders but requiring them to be filled before any transaction
could occur, our trading mechanism builds in a salient feature of the R1 rationing rule. I
is interesting that traders rarely exploited this feature. To the extent that our experimenta
results are close to the theory, this suggests some robustness to the rationing rule.
622 journal of political economy
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on the selling side, although voters enter the market endowed with a
single vote, they could resell in bulk votes they have purchased. For each
committee size, the first row is the average number of transactions per
2-minute trading round in the different markets. The transactions can
be read as net trades because the percentage of reselling was in all cases
lower than 5 percent.23 As the table shows, the number of transactions is
quite constant across markets and slightly higher than the theoretical
predictionoftwoforn55 and four for n5 9. Most transactions concerned
individual votes (row 2), and indeed so did most orders in general, not
only those that were accepted (row 5).24 Finally, most transactions also orig-
inated from accepted offers (row 3), and again most orders, whether ac-
cepted or not, were offers to sell as opposed to bids to buy (row 6).
2. Final Allocation of VotesHow close to the theory were the final vote allocations? Figure 5 shows
the average number of votes held by voters at the end of each round,
23 We define speculation as the total number of votes that were bothbought and sold by the
same player. As an average across markets, it is 1 percent of trades when n55 and 3 percent-
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compared to the equilibrium prediction. Voters are ordered on the hori
zontal axis, from lowest to highest valuation, but recall that in the exper
(as opposed to 250 rounds for the two highest-valuation traders) and in 10 rounds when
n59 (as opposed to 40 for the two highest-valuation traders).
TABLE 5
Observed Percentage of Rounds in Which One of the Two Highest-Value
Subjects Is Dictator
Market
HB HT LB LT Average
n55
All data 50 40 100 60 62.5
Last two rounds 62.5 37.5 100 75 68.75
Last match 100 100 100 20 80
n59
All data 25 0 15 0 10
Last two rounds 25 0 25 0 12.5
Last match 80 0 0 0 20
624 journal of political economy
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-iment voters had no information about others’ valuations or about the
ranking of their own valuation. Markets with valuations concentrated at
the bottom of the distributions (B) appear to conform to the theory quite
well: the highest-valuation voters end the round with a large fraction of
the votes. In particular, if the market is LB, the distribution of votes across
voters does increase sharply for the highest-valuation voters, exactly as the
theory suggests, and this is true for both n5 5 and n5 9. In markets with
valuations concentrated at the top of the distribution (T), the results de-
viate from the theory, most clearly in n5 9 markets: the highest-valuation
voters demand fewer votes on average than their equilibriumdemand, and
the number of votes held increases smoothly as the valuations increase.
Not all deviations from equilibrium allocations have welfare conse-
quences: the important question is the concentration of votes the theory
predicts at the top of the distribution of values. Is dictatorship observed in
the experiment? Table 5 shows the frequency withwhich either the highest-
or the second-highest-value voter concluded a trading round owing a ma-
jority of the votes, for different markets and different committee sizes. For
given n, the first row in the table reports the frequency of dictatorship over
the full data set (20 rounds for each market), the second row reports the
frequency over the last two rounds of eachmatch (eight rounds in all), and
the last row reports the frequency over the last match (five rounds in all).25
Over the full data set, in n5 5 committees, dictatorship emerged just
above 62 percent of the times. In the LB market, the data do match the
theory perfectly in this regard: out of 20 rounds, in four different exper-
25 There are some instances in which the third-highest-value trader emerged as dictator:
over the full data set and summing over all markets, this occurred in 15 rounds when n55
imental sessions, all 20 result in dictatorship. In n5 9 committees, where
the purchase of four, as opposed to two, votes is required for dictatorship,
TABLE 6
LogitRegressionoftheProbabilityof aDictatoras a Function
of Match Number, Round Number, H, T, and n59 Dummies
Variable Coefficient
95% Confidence
Interval
Match .50 [2.23, 1.23]
Round .29** [.07, .50]
Dummies:
H 21.15 [22.66, .35]
T 21.70** [23.06, 2.35]
9 23.42** [24.95, 21.89]
Constant .77 [2.84, 2.38]
Note.—Data are clustered by n, session, andmarket, and standard
errors are robust. N 5 160; pseudo R2 5 .384.
** Significant at 5 percent.
competitive equilibrium in markets for votes 625the results are much weaker, with an average frequency of dictatorship
of 10 percent. In T markets, in particular, where valuations are concen-
trated at the top of the distribution, competition among the higher-value
voters clearly works against the concentration of five votes in the hand of
the same voter; in B markets, dictatorship does in fact occur, on average,
20 percent of the times.
We have seen earlier that realized prices tend to be high, an observa-
tion that rationalizes the reluctance to buy the number of votes required
to exert full control. But as prices converge toward equilibrium values, we
should see an increase in the frequency of dictatorship. For each n, lines 2
and 3 in table 5 indeed suggest this conclusion, although the samples be-
come very small. More formal support is provided by a logit regression of
the probability of dictatorship by one of the two highest-value voters, as a
function ofmarket characteristics (H andT dummies), time dummies for
round and match, and committee size. The regression shows that the
probability is significantly higher in the last round of each match and is
significantly lower in Tmarkets and in committees of nine voters. The re-
sults are reported in table 6.
The coefficients of the logit regression allow us to quantify the in-
fluence of experience on the probability of dictatorship, as reported in
table 7. The benchmark market is the LB market with n5 5, and the
constant term, applied to the logistic function, translates into a default
probability of dictatorship of 68 percent. Keeping in mind that the stan-
dard errors are large, in the benchmark market the regression explains
an increase in the probability of dictatorship per round of 4.7 percentage
points, on average, in the first match, an increase per round that persists,
although at a declining rate, in later matches. The regression assigns a
still larger impact to experience in the other n5 5markets, with a trendThis content downloaded  on Thu, 13 Dec 2012 11:28:06 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
across matches that depends on market characteristics. In particular, in
the HT market the probability of dictatorship not only increases over
TABLE 7
Point Estimates of the Average Percentage Change per Round in the
Probability of Dictatorship, for Each Match
n55 n59
Match Match
Market 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
HT 4.3 5.6 6.7 7.0 .2 .4 .6 .9
HB 7.0 6.3 5.1 3.8 1.1 1.7 2.6 3.8
LT 6.9 7.0 6.4 5.3 .7 1.1 1.7 2.5
LB 4.7 3.5 2.6 1.6 2.9 4.2 5.5 6.5
626 journal of political economysuccessive rounds, as expected, but increases more in later matches, pos-
sibly capturing the higher complexity of the equilibrium discovery in a
market with more high-value voters. This feature is also common to all
n59 markets, again possibly reflecting their complexity.
C. WelfareA large part of the motivation for this paper is the unresolved debate
in the literature over the welfare properties of a market for votes relative
to simple majority. How high were the subjects’ payoffs in the experi-
ment, relative to what the subjects would have earned in the absence of
vote trading? And how well does our model predict the realize welfare
rankings?
According to the theory, the equilibrium strategy is invariant to the di-
rection of a voter’s preferences. In the experiment, voters participated in
themarket and submitted their orders without information about others’
realized preferred alternative; all they knew was that any voter was as-
signed either alternative as preferred with probability one-half. Thus a
voter’s trading behavior should be independent of both his own and
other voters’ realized direction of preferences. When evaluating the wel-
fare implications of a specific vote allocation, the exact realization of the
direction of preferences matters, but the interesting welfare measure is
the average welfare associated with such an allocation, for all possible
realizations of the directions of preferences. It is such a measure that we
calculate on the basis of the experimental data.26
26 In the experiment, the observed difference in outcomes between the vote market and
majority rule depends on the random realization of the subjects’ direction of preferences. It
could happen, e.g., that all committeemembers agree, and the outcome would then be triv-
ially identical. But this is a small-sample problem. Calculating expected welfare with the re-
alized allocationof votes takes into account all possible realizations of preferences, weighted
by their probability, and allows us to derive maximal information from the limited data set.
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For each profile of valuations and for the realized allocation of votes at
the end of each round, we compute the average aggregate payoff for all
competitive equilibrium in markets for votes 627possible profiles of preferences’ directions, weighted by the probability
of their realization. The number we obtain, WVM ;r , is our measure of ex-
perimental payoffs in round r. For a given profile of valuations, the stan-
dard deviation across rounds gives us a measure of payoffs variability due
to the variability in vote allocations generated by trading. We then aver-
age WVM ;r over all rounds, for a given profile of valuations, and obtain
WVM , average experimental payoffs per market. We compute the equiva-
lent measure with majority voting, WMR ; that is, for each profile of valua-
tions, for all possible realizations of preferences’ directions, we resolve the
disagreement in favor of themorenumerous side; taking into account the
probability of each realization, we then compute the average aggregate
payoff. To ease the comparison of payoffs across the two institutions, the
differentmarkets, and the different committee sizes, we express bothWVM
andWMR as normalized scores, relative to a ceilingW and a floorW . For
each market, W is the average maximum payoff, calculated by selecting
the alternative favored by the side with higher aggregate valuation, and
W is the average payoff with random decision making, where either al-
ternative is selected with probability one-half. The welfare score then is
ðWVM 2W Þ=ðW 2W Þ for the experimental data, and correspondingly
for majority voting.27
Figure 6 plots, for each market, the normalized welfare score in the ex-
perimental data, together with its 95 percent confidence interval, and for
the same profile of valuations the welfare score that corresponds to ma-
jority voting (hollow square) and to the theoretical equilibrium (hollow
triangle). The figure shows several interesting regularities. First, realized
welfare mimics equilibrium welfare more closely in markets with low val-
uations, indeed very closely in three out of four cases. In markets with
high valuations, realized welfare is consistently higher than predicted
welfare, reflecting the lower frequency of dictatorship in the data. Sec-
ond, the theoretical analysis predicts that vote markets should perform
better, relative to simple majority with no trade, when valuations are con-
centrated at the bottom of the distributions. In particular, as shown in fig-
ure 6, vote markets should dominate majority in market LB, be slightly
worse inmarket HB, and be substantially worse inmarkets LTandHT, for
both committee sizes. In the data, themarket for votes is significantly bet-
ter thanmajority with no trade in only one case, the LBmarket with n59.
It is marginally but insignificantly better in the other B markets and sig-
nificantly worse in all Tmarkets, where valuations are concentrated at the
top of the distribution. This remains true even though, as we saw, voters
27 Note that the only source of variability across rounds comes from the different vote al-
locations with a market for votes. For a given profile of valuations, WMR , W , and W are all
constant.
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deviated from equilibrium toward a more egalitarian allocation of votes
and thus were closer to majority rule than theory predicts.
FIG. 6.—Normalized welfare score per market
628 journal of political economyV. ConclusionsThis paper proposes a new competitive equilibrium approach that can be
applied to vote markets. Vote markets have a number of unusual proper-
ties that require a nonstandard approach. Votes are lumpy (as is the pub-
lic decision) andhave no intrinsic value; in fact their value depends on the
number of votes held by others, a characteristic that creates both external-
ities and discontinuities in payoffs.Wedefine the concept of ex ante com-
petitive equilibrium, a concept that combines the price-taking assump-
tion of competitive equilibrium in a market for goods with other less
standard assumptions: traders best respond to the demands of other trad-
ers,mixed demands are allowed, andmarket clearing holds only in expec-
tation. Thus deviations frommarket clearing cannot be systematic and ex-
pected, but rationing is typically required ex post, and the equilibrium is
defined relative to an anonymous rationing rule.
Using a constructive proof, we establish the existence of an ex ante
competitive equilibrium in a vote market in which voters have incom-
plete information about other members’ preferences and a single binary
decision has to be made, and we fully characterize the properties of this
equilibrium.This content downloaded  on Thu, 13 Dec 2012 11:28:06 AM
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A striking feature of the vote allocation in the equilibriumwe character-
ize is that whenever there is trade, there is a dictator: with probability one,
competitive equilibrium in markets for votes 629a single voter acquires amajority position. This feature pins down the wel-
fare properties of the votemarket. Because themarket results in a dictator
and because the dictator must be one of the two highest-valuation (or in-
tensity) voters, the welfare effects depend on the distribution of valua-
tions and on the size of the electorate or committee. In small committees,
trade may increase ex ante welfare if there is a sufficient wedge between
the two highest valuations and the average of the others, but the required
wedge is quite large and increasing in the size of the committee.When the
number of voters is large, the market always creates inefficiencies relative
to simplemajority voting. Intuitively, as n gets larger, the probability of be-
ing dictator decreases faster than the probability of being pivotal in the
absence of trade.
The theoretical findings are examined using data from a laboratory
market experiment with five- and nine-person committees, where the
votemarket was conducted as a continuousmultiple-unit open-book dou-
ble auction. By varying the distribution of valuations and the size of the
committee, we are able to manipulate the predicted outcomes across the
experimental treatments.
The data show overpricing relative to risk neutrality but aremostly con-
sistent with equilibrium predictions with risk aversion. Estimates of as-
ymptotic price convergence fail to reject the competitive pricing model
in six of our eight treatments and reject itmarginally in the remaining two
treatments. As predicted by the theory, prices did not vary significantly
with valuations if the top two valuations were fixed. In addition, again in
line with the theory, prices were higher in smaller committees and in
treatments in which the top two valuations were higher, although neither
of these comparative statics results is statistically significant.
Observed vote allocations were less skewed than predicted when valua-
tions were concentrated at the top of the distribution. They were instead
close to equilibrium allocations when the two top valuations were signif-
icantly higher than the remainder. In smaller committees, such treat-
ments resulted in dictatorship 75 percent of the time over the full data set
and between 80 and 100 percent of the time when traders were experi-
enced. In larger committees, where the purchase of four votes is required
for dictatorship, the frequency of dictatorship was much lower, but dicta-
torship still arose, on average, between one-fourth and one-fifth of the
times when the discrepancy between the top two valuations and the
others was large. In all cases, the probability of dictatorship increased sig-
nificantly with experience, suggesting that subjects may require time to
discover the equilibrium in such complex markets.
Finally, the welfare results in the experiment were superior to the the-
oretical prediction in half of our treatments (and indistinguishable in theThis content downloaded  on Thu, 13 Dec 2012 11:28:06 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
remainder), reflecting the lower frequency of dictatorship, especially in
committees of nine voters. But the predicted welfare ranking, relative to
630 journal of political economymajority voting with no trade, was realized inmost treatments: average ex-
perimental payoffs were significantly lower than majority voting payoffs
would have been when the discrepancy between the top valuations and
all others was small and were higher, but insignificantly so, otherwise.
There are still many open questions about vote markets, and in our ex-
periment we explore only the simplest environment. In a related paper
(Casella et al. 2012), we study the robustness of the results derived here to
different information assumptions and to asymmetries between the sup-
porters of each alternative. A key direction of future research is to extend
the model to multiple issues. Here we consider only a one-issue vote mar-
ket, but in principle the same approach can be applied to the more gen-
eral case of committees that vote on multiple issues, such as legislatures,
boards, and standing committees. With multiple issues, the model will
then be able to address questions of logrolling in which the market effec-
tively becomes a means for a voter to accumulate votes on issues he cares
most about in exchange for his vote on issues he cares less about. The wel-
fare properties of multi-issue vote markets are likely to be more compli-
cated to analyze. Extrapolating from our findings suggests significant in-
efficiencies, as found in other models of vote exchange that focus on
simple bartering examples (Riker and Brams 1973), rather than taking
a general equilibrium approach as we do here. On the other hand, ineffi-
ciencies might bemitigated in the presence ofmultiple issues by themore
numerous possibilities for gains from trade, as suggested by abstractmod-
els of mechanisms that link decisions across multiple dimensions (Cas-
ella 2005; Jackson and Sonnenschein 2007; Hortala-Vallve 2012).Appendix A
ProofsProof of Lemma 1
We prove the lemma in two parts. First, we show that there exists a finite thresh-
old mn ≥ 1 such that if vn > mnvn21, then gn215 ðn2 1Þ=ðn1 1Þ, gn51, and p5
vn21=ðn1 1Þ. Second, we show that if vn ≤ mnvn21, then gn21, gn, and p are the so-
lutions to the system formed by equations (1), (2), (3), and (4).
1. There exists a finite threshold mn ≥ 1 such that if vn > mnvn21, then gn215
ðn21Þ=ðn1 1Þ, gn5 1, and p5 vn21=ðn1 1Þ.
1a. Voter n2 1 has no profitable deviation: If voter n2 1 offers to sell, the total
supply of votes is n2 1 votes. Voter n demands ðn21Þ=2 votes. Thus total de-
mand equals ðn2 1Þ=2, and voter n21’s probability of being rationed is equal
to one-half. Therefore, U n21ð21Þ5 12vn211 12p. If voter n21 demands ðn2 1Þ=2
votes, he is again rationed with probability one-half, and his expected utility isThis content downloaded  on Thu, 13 Dec 2012 11:28:06 AM
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U n21
n21
2
 
5
3
4
vn212
n2 1
4
p:
competitive equilibrium in markets for votes 631The price that makes him indifferent is exactly p5 vn21=ðn1 1Þ. Demanding other
quantities is strictly dominated: a smaller quantity can be accommodated with no
rationing, but voter n2 1 would pay the units demanded, and voter n, with a ma-
jority, would always decide; a larger quantity is equivalent if n2 1 is rationed but is
costly and redundant if n21 is not rationed.
1b. Voters 1, 2, . . . , n2 2 have no profitable deviation: Buying votes can be ad-
vantageous only if it can prevent both voter n21 and voter n from becoming dic-
tator, but a demand of more than ðn2 1Þ=2 is always dominated. Thus the only
positive demands to consider are ½ðn21Þ=221 or ðn21Þ=2 votes. In the pro-
posed equilibrium, for any i ∈ f1; : : :; n22g,
U ið2 1Þ5 1
2
vi1
n223
2ðn2 2Þðn11Þ p; ðA1Þ
U i
n21
2
 
5
4n15
6ðn11Þ vi2
n21n2 2
6ðn11Þ p if n> 3
3
4
v12
1
4
p if n5 3;
8><
>>: ðA2Þ
U i
n2 3
2
 
5
n 1 2 1ðn2 1Þ½12 22 ðn11Þ=2
3ðn11Þ vi2
ðn 2 3Þðn 1 5Þ
6ðn11Þ p if n> 3
5
8
v1 if n53:
8><
>>: ðA3Þ
It is easy to see that selling dominates in the case of n53. In the case of n> 3,
(A1) is larger than (A2) whenever vn21=vi ≥ ðn224Þ=ðn21 n25Þ, which holds for
any positive n, and (A1) is larger than (A3) whenever
vn21
vi
≥
ðn221Þðn2 2Þ½12 22ðn21Þ=2
n313n2219n121
;
which also holds for any positive n.
1c. Voter n has no profitable deviation if vn ≥ mnvn21: In the proposed equilib-
rium, the expected utilities to voter n fromdemanding amajority of votes or from
deviating and ordering g fewer votes are given by
U n
n2 1
2
 
5
3n15
4ðn11Þvn2
n212n23
4ðn11Þ p; ðA4Þ
U n
n21
2
2 g
 
5
n2114fnðg Þ
2ðn11Þ vn2
n2 1
2
2 g
 
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½ðn21Þ=21g
i ≥ g
n2 1
2
1g
i
!

 
1
2
!½ðn21Þ=21g
:
 
Equation (A4) is larger than (A5) whenever g1 2  fnðg Þ ≤ ðn21 3n1 4Þ=2ðn
1 1Þ holds. The left-hand side is increasing in g and therefore reaches its maxi-
mum at g 5 ðn2 1Þ=2, that is, when voter n does not buy a vote at all. We need to
show that fnððn21Þ=2Þ ≤ 14½ð3n1 5Þ=ðn1 1Þ. The inequality holds for any n since
fnððn21Þ=2Þ ≤ 34.
Finally, the expected utility to voter n from offering to sell his vote is given by
U nð21Þ5n21
n11
1
2
ðvn1 pÞ1 2n11
1
2
1
n21
n21
2
!
22 n
 #
:
"
Thus U nð21Þ ≤ U nððn2 1Þ=2Þ whenever
vn
vn21
≥ ðn21Þðn15Þ ðn11Þ n132
n21
n21
2
!
22 ðn23Þ
 #" )21
; mn :
(
The conditiondefines the threshold mn and establishes the first part of the lemma:
voter n has no incentive to deviate as long as vn ≥ mnvn21. Note that mn51 if n53.
Hence for n53, the equilibrium is fully characterized.
2. If vn ≤ mnvn21, then gn21, gn, and p are the solutions to the system formed by
equations (1), (2), (3), and (4).
Given that voters n2 1 and n randomize between demanding a majority and
offering their vote, they must be indifferent between these two options. For voter
n2 1,
U n21ð21Þ51
2
vn211ð12gnÞfvn211gn
1
2
p
and
U n21
n21
2
 
5

12
1
2
gn

vn212
n21
2
p
 
1
1
4
gnvn21;
when the indexes are exchanged, the corresponding equations hold for voter
n. The two conditions U n21ð21Þ5U n21ððn2 1Þ=2Þ and U nð21Þ5U nððn2 1Þ=2Þ
yield (2) and (3).28 Equation (1) is the market-clearing condition.
Given equations (1), (2), and (3), it must be that gn21 and gn are determined by
the following system of equations:
224f2 ð12 4fÞgn
2ðn2 1Þ2 ðn23Þgn
5
224f2 ð12 4fÞgn21
2ðn2 1Þ2 ðn23Þgn21
J;
gn215
2n
n11
2gn ;
ðA6Þ
28 Note that 0< f ≤ 14, and therefore the numerator is positive and so is the denominator.This content downloaded  on Thu, 13 Dec 2012 11:28:06 AM
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where, as earlier, ! 
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n21
n21
2
and we define J5 vn=vn21. If J51, it must be gn215gn5n=ðn1 1Þ, and there-
fore,
p5
n122 4f
n213n2 2
vn21:
If J> 1, gn is the solution of a quadratic equation in n and J: aðn; JÞg2n1 bðn;
JÞgn2 cðn; JÞ50, where
aðn; JÞ5 ðJ21Þð12 4fÞðn23Þðn11Þ;
bðn; JÞ52f½12J12fð3J21Þn21½8fð22JÞ2 51Jn
2 2ð12fÞðJ11Þg;
cðn; JÞ54f11Jðn21Þ23n12f½Jðn2 1Þ213n2 1g:
Given that aðn; JÞ> 0 and cðn; JÞ> 0,29 (1) the discriminant is positive and the
solution well defined, (2) the requirement gn > 0 selects the solution
2bðn; JÞ1
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
bðn; JÞ214aðn; JÞcðn; JÞ
p
2aðn; JÞ > 0;
and (3)
2bðn; JÞ1
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
bðn; JÞ214aðn; JÞcðn; JÞ
p
2aðn; JÞ ≤ 1
whenever J ≤ mn. Finally, it is easy to see from (A6) that gn ≥ gn21 and therefore
gn21 ∈ ½ðn21Þ=ðn1 1Þ; n=ðn1 1Þ and gn ∈ ½n=ðn1 1Þ; 1.
2a. Voters n21 and n have no profitable deviations: We want to show that
Ui
n21
2
2 g
 
≤ Ui
n21
2
2 ðg11Þ
 
29 To show that cðn; JÞ is positive, we need to show that
J ≥ ½ð3n21Þð122fÞ=fðn21Þ½2fðn21Þ11gholds. Given that J> 1, it is sufficient to show that
1 ≥ ½ð3n21Þð122fÞ=fðn21Þ½2fðn21Þ11g:
This inequality can be rewritten as f ≥ 1=ðn1 1Þ, which can be easily shown to hold.
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for both i ∈ fn21; ng, where g ∈ f1; 2; : : :; ðn21Þ=2g. The utility of demand-
ing ½ðn2 1Þ=22 g votes is given by
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n21
2
2 g
 
5gj
1
2
vi1ð12gjÞfnðg Þvi2
n21
2
2 g
 
p;
where
fnðg Þ5 o
½ðn21Þ=21g
i ≥ g
n21
2
1g
i
!


1
2
½ðn21Þ=21g 
is the probability that at least g other players left with a vote agree with i ’s will;
j 5n if i5n2 1, and j 5n2 1 if i5n. By demanding fewer than ðn2 1Þ=2 votes,
individual i is never rationed; but if individual j demands a majority, j ’s will is im-
plemented with probability one. Proving
Ui
n2 1
2
2 g
 
≤ Ui
n21
2
2 ðg11Þ
 
is equivalent to proving p ≥ ð12gjÞviðfnðg Þ2fnðg1 1ÞÞ. Given that this inequality
is more restrictive for voter n, it is sufficient to show that p ≥ ð12gn21Þvnðfnðg Þ
2fnðg1 1ÞÞ holds. And given that p ≥ ðn1 224fÞ=ðn21 3n22Þvn21, 12gn21
≤ 2=ðn1 1Þ and vn ≤ ½ðn21Þðn1 5Þ=½ðn1 1Þðn1 328fÞvn21 (5mnvn21), it is suf-
ficient to show30
ðn11Þ2ðn122 4fÞðn1328fÞ
2ðn21Þðn15Þðn213n22Þ ≥ f
nðg Þ2fnðg11Þ:
But fnðg Þ2fnðg1 1Þ is maximized at g 5 ½ðn2 1Þ=221, and
fn
n2 1
2
21
 
2 fn
n2 1
2
 
5 f:
In addition, f ≤ 14. Hence the inequality holds whenever
ðn11Þ4
2ðn2 1Þðn15Þðn213n22Þ ≥
1
4
30 The lower boundon p can be obtained as follows. First, see that f ðxÞ5 ða2 bxÞ=ðc2dxÞ
is increasing if and only if ad > bc. Therefore, we can see from eq. (A6) that p increases with
gn iff f ≥ 1=ðn1 1Þ or, alternatively, ! ðn11Þ
n21
n21
2
22n ≥ 1:
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holds. And this last inequality holds for any n (it can be reduced to n41 n31
7n21 31n28 ≥ 0).
competitive equilibrium in markets for votes 635Finally, it is easy to see that not offering or demanding is dominated by selling.
Hence, there exist no profitable deviations.
2b. Voters 1 to n22 have no profitable deviations: The utilities of these voters
are given by the following expressions:
U ð21Þ51
2
v1Afv1B
1
2
p1C
n21
2ðn22Þ p;
U
n2 1
2
 
5A v2
n21
2
p
 
1B
3
4
v2
n2 1
4
p
 
1C
2
3
v2
n21
6
p
 
;
U
n23
2
 
5A ½1222ðn11Þ=2v2n23
2
p
 
1B
1
2
v2
n23
2
p
 
1 C
2222 ðn11Þ=2
3
v2
n23
6
p
 
;
U
n21
2
2 g
 
5Afnðg Þv1ðB1C Þ1
2
v2
n2 1
2
2 g
 
p;
where A5 ð12gnÞð12gn21Þ, B5gnð12gn21Þ1 ð12gnÞgn21, C 5gngn21, and g ∈
f2; : : :; ðn2 1Þ=2g.
In ruling out deviations by voters 1; : : :; n22, we begin by showing that de-
manding any number of votes different from ðn21Þ=2 or ðn2 3Þ=2 is strictly
dominated by selling. We then show that selling dominates these two remaining
options too.
2b(i). U ð21Þ> U ððn21Þ=22 g Þ for all g ∈ f2; : : :; ðn2 1Þ=2g: First we show
that demanding ðn21Þ=22 ðg 21Þ votes is dominated by demanding ðn2
1Þ=22 g . Then
U
n21
2
2 g
 
≥ U
n21
2
2 ðg 2 1Þ
 
It is easy to show that this holds by induction. First, see that it holds with equality when n53.
Second, it is easy to show that if ! ðn11Þ
n21
n21
2
22n
is larger than one forn, then itmust be larger than one for n1 2. Hence, theupperboundon
the price can be obtained by setting gn 5 1 and the lower bound by setting gn 5n=ðn1 1Þ.
This gives
p ∈
n1224f
n213n22
vn21;
vn21
n11
 
:
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can be rewritten as
636 journal of political economyp ≥ ð12gnÞ gn2
n21
n11
 
½fnðg 21Þ2fnðg Þvi :
Given that p ≥ ðn1 224fÞ=ðn21 3n2 2Þvn21,
ð12gnÞ gn2
n2 1
n11
 
≤
1
ðn11Þ2
and vi ≤ vn21 (for all i ≤ n22), the inequality can be reduced to ðn1 1Þ2ðn1 2
2 4fÞ=ðn21 3n2 2Þ ≥ fnðg 21Þ2fnðg Þ, which holds trivially since ðn1 1Þ2ðn1 2
2 4fÞ=ðn21 3n2 2Þ> 1 and fnðg 21Þ2fnðg Þ< 1. ButU ð21Þ> U ð0Þ, and the re-
sult follows.
2b(ii). Uið2 1Þ> Uiððn2 1Þ=2Þ, where i ≤ n22: The condition corresponds to

2
1
2
1ð12gnÞð12gn21Þð12fÞ
1
3
4
½gnð12gn21Þ1ð12gnÞgn211
2
3
gngn21

vi
≤

ð12gnÞð12gn21Þ
n21
2
1½gnð12gn21Þ1ð12gnÞgn21
n11
4
1
2
3
gngn21
n221
6ðn22Þ

p:
Given vi ≤ vn21 and ð12fÞvn21> ½ðn2 1Þ=2p, 34vn21> ½ðn1 1Þ=4p, and 23vn21
> ½ðn221Þ=6ðn22Þp, the inequality must hold if it holds when we replace
ð12gnÞð12gn21Þ, gnð12gn21Þ1 ð12gnÞgn21, and gngn21 by their upper bounds
1=ðn1 1Þ2, 2=ðn1 1Þ, and ½n=ðn1 1Þ2, respectively. After simplification, the con-
dition reduces to
ðn2 2Þðn213n11226fÞ
nðn313n12n218Þ ≤
p
vn21
:
But using the lower bound on the price, p ≥ ½ðn1 224fÞ=ðn21 3n22Þvn21, a
sufficient condition is then
f ≤
n41n32 6n2148n248
4n416n312n2224n224
;
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2b(iii). Uið2 1Þ> Uiððn23Þ=2Þ, where i ≤ n22: The result is trivial in the case
of n53 (and recall that for n5 3 the equilibrium described here collapses to the
competitive equilibrium in markets for votes 637equilibrium described in the first part of lemma 1). In what follows we will
prove the result for n ≥ 5. For ease of presentation, define v :5 12 ð12Þðn11Þ=2.
Then Uið21Þ> Uiððn23Þ=2Þ holds whenever

2
1
2
1ð12gnÞð12gn21Þðv2fÞ1
1
2
½gnð12gn21Þ
1 gn21ð12gnÞ1
v11
3
gngn21

vi
≤ ð12gnÞð12gn21Þ
n23
2
1½gnð12gn21Þ
1 gn21ð12gnÞ
n2 2
2
1gngn21
n22 2n13
6ðn22Þ p:
Taking into account the expected market-clearing condition, the left-hand side
of the inequality is maximized at gn5gn215n=ðn1 1Þ and the right-hand side is
minimized at gn5gn215n=ðn1 1Þ.31 Therefore, it is sufficient to prove that
fð2v2 1Þn32 ð4v2 2Þn21½6ðv2fÞ23n2 ½12ðv2fÞ26gvi
≤ ðn414n3218n219n118Þp:
But given p ≥ ðn1 22 4fÞ=ðn21 3n2 2Þvn21 and vi ≤ vn21, a sufficient condition is
0 ≤ 2ð12 vÞn512ð42 2f2 vÞn42 ½112 10ðv2fÞn3
2 ð38114v278fÞn2121ð12 4f12vÞn16ð1128f2 4vÞ:
Using v∈ ½34; 1 and f ∈ ½0; 14, a sufficient condition is 5n42 6n3252n21 ð63=2Þn
1 30 ≥ 0, which is verified for all n ≥ 5.
The lemma is proved and theorem 1 follows immediately. QED31 First, consider gn 5 x, gn21 5 y, and the constraint x1 y5 s. Plugging this constraint in-
to the function axy1 b½xð12 yÞ1 yð12 xÞ1 hð12 xÞð12 yÞ, it is easy to see that its deriva-
tive with respect to x equals zero iff x 5 s=2. In our case, this means gn 5gn215n=ðn1 1Þ.
Moreover, this point is a maximum (minimum) whenever 2b2a2h is positive (negative).
Consider the left-hand side of the inequality, with a5 ðv1 1Þ=3, b5 12, and h5 v2f. It is
easy to see that in this case 2b2a2h< 0, and therefore, the left-hand side is maximized
at gn 5gn215n=ðn1 1Þ. Similarly, the right-hand side of the inequality corresponds to the
equation above with a5 ðn222n1 3Þ=6ðn22Þ, b5 ðn22Þ=2, and h5 ðn23Þ=2. In this
case, 2b2a2h> 0, and therefore there is a minimum at gn 5gn215n=ðn1 1Þ.
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Proof of Proposition 2
638 journal of political economyIf ðv1; : : :; vnÞ are independent draws from a uniform distribution, we can write
WVM < n!E1
0
Evn=mn
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  Ev2
0
vn
2n
1
v11  1vn
2n
 
dv1  dvn
1 n!E1
0
Evn
vn=mn
  Ev2
0
½12 ð12gnÞð12gn21Þ
vn
2n
1
v11  1vn
2n
 
dv1  dvn
1 n!E1
0
Evn
vn=mn
  Ev2
0
ð12gnÞð12gn21Þ
v11  1vn
n
 
1
2
1f

dv1  dvn;
ðA7Þ
WMR 5n!E1
0
Evn=mn
0
  Ev2
0
v11  1vn
n
 
1
2
1f

dv1  dvn
1 n!E1
0
Evn
vn=mn
  Ev2
0
½12 ð12gnÞð12gn 2 1Þ
v11  1vn
n
 


1
2
1f

dv1  dvn
1 n!E1
0
Evn
vn=mn
  Ev2
0
ð12gnÞð12gn 2 1Þ
v11  1vn
n
 


1
2
1f

dv1  dvn ;
ðA8Þ
where mn ≥ 1 is the threshold such that, for vn <mnvn21, voter n offers his vote for
sale with positive probability (gn < 1). The threshold mn is defined in the proof of
lemma 1:
mn5 ðn21Þðn15Þ ðn11Þ n132
n21
n21
2
!
22ðn23Þ
 #" )21
:
(
Suppose first n53. Then mn51, and WVM <WMR if
n!E1
0
Evn
0
  Ev2
0
vn
2n
1
v11  1vn
2n
 
dv1  dvn
≤ n!E1
0
Evn
0
  Ev2
0
v11  1vn
n
 
1
2
1f

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or, solving the integrals,  
competitive equilibrium in markets for votes 639WVM <WMR if
n13
4ðn11Þ ≤
1
2
1
2
1f :
At n 5 3, f 5 14, and the sufficient condition is satisfied with strict equality.
Suppose now n ≥ 5. Note that, by lemma 1, if vn21> vn=mn , 12 ð12gnÞð12
gn21Þ ∈ ½121=ðn1 1Þ2; 1. Hence, by (A7) and (A8) above,
WVM <WMR ⇐ n!E1
0
Evn=mn
0
  Ev2
0
vn
2n
1
v11  1vn
2n
 
dv1  dvn
1 n!E1
0
Evn
vn=mn
  Ev2
0
vn
2n
1
v11  1vn
2n
 
dv1  dvn
<n!E1
0
Evn=mn
0
  Ev2
0
v11  1vn
n
 
1
2
1f

dv1  dvn
1 n!E1
0
Evn
vn=mn
  Ev2
0
12
1
ðn11Þ2
 
v11  1vn
n
 
1
2
1f

dv1  dvn
or
n!E1
0
Evn
0
  Ev2
0
vn
2n
1
v11  1vn
2n
 
dv1  dvn
<n!E1
0
Evn
0
  Ev2
0
v11  1vn
n
 
1
2
1f

dv1  dvn
2n!E1
0
Evn
vn=mn
  Ev2
0
1
ðn11Þ2
 
v11  1vn
n
 
1
2
1f

dv1  dvn:
A still stronger, but simpler, sufficient condition is then
n!E1
0
Evn
0
  Ev2
0
vn
2n
1
v11  1vn
2n
 
dv1  dvn
< n! 12
1
ðn11Þ2
 E1
0
Evn
0
  Ev2
0
v11  1vn
n
 
1
2
1f

dv1  dvn
or
n13
4ðn11Þ < 12
1
ðn11Þ2
 
1
2

1
2
1f

for n> 3:
It is not difficult to verify that if the inequality is satisfied at some value n 0, then it is
satisfied at n 01 2. It can be checked immediately that it is satisfied at n5 5; henceThis content downloaded  on Thu, 13 Dec 2012 11:28:06 AM
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by induction it is satisfied at all n odd larger than 5. Together with the previous
result for n5 3, this concludes the proof. QED
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The proposition follows from the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Suppose that hi 5
1
2, wi 51, mi 50 for all i, and uð  Þ5 2e2rð Þ with
r> 0; R1 is the rationing rule. Then for all n there exists a finite threshold m′n ≥ 1
such that if vn ≥ m′nvn21, the set of actions presented in theorem 1 together with
gn215 ðn2 1Þ=ðn1 1Þ, gn51, and
p5
2
rðn11Þ ln

1
2
1
1
2
e rvn21

constitute an ex ante competitive equilibrium.
Proof of lemma 2. In the ex ante competitive equilibriumdescribed in lemma2,
voter n demands ðn21Þ=2 votes with probability one, voters 1 to n22 offer their
vote for sale, and voter n21 demands ðn2 1Þ=2 votes with probability ðn2
1Þ=ðn1 1Þ and offers to sell his vote with complementary probability 2=ðn1 1Þ. As
in the proof of lemma 1, consider the incentives of the different voters in turn.
Voter n21: As in lemma 1, p must be such that individual n2 1 is indifferent
between selling his vote and demanding amajority of votes. If voter n21 offers to
sell his vote, he is rationed with probability one-half; whether he is rationed or
not, the decision is made by voter n, who owns a majority of votes and agrees with
voter n21 with probability one-half. Thus
U n21ð2 1Þ5 1
4
½uð0Þ1uðvn21Þ1uðpÞ1uðvn211pÞ:
If voter n2 1 demands ðn21Þ=2 votes, he is again rationed withe probability one-
half; if he is not rationed, he is dictator; if he is rationed, the dictator is voter n,
who agrees with n21 with probability one-half. Hence
U n21
n21
2
 
5
1
4
½uð0Þ1uðvn21Þ112u vn212
n21
2
p
 
:
Thus the price at which n2 1 is indifferent must solve
uðpÞ1uðvn211pÞ52  u vn212n212 p
 
: ðA9Þ
In the case of a CARA utility, the price that makes voter n21 indifferent is com-
putable and equal to
p5
2
rðn11Þ ln

1
2
1
1
2
e rvn21

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As in lemma 1, demanding other quantities is strictly dominated because it is
either equivalent to demanding ðn21Þ=2 if voter n21 is rationed or strictly worse
competitive equilibrium in markets for votes 641if he is not.
Voter n: In equilibrium, voter n’s expected utility from demanding ðn21Þ=2
votes is given by
U n
n21
2
 
5
2
n11
u vn2
n2 1
2
p
 
1
n21
2ðn11Þ
1
2
uð0Þ11
2
uðvnÞ1u vn2n212 p
  
:
If voter n deviates and offers his vote for sale, his expected utility is
U nð2 1Þ5 2
n11
fn
n21
2
 
uðvnÞ1 12fn n2 12
  
uð0Þ
 
1
n21
2ðn11Þ

1
2
uð0Þ11
2
uðvnÞ112uðpÞ1uðvn1pÞ

;
where, as defined earlier,
fn
n21
2
 
5 o
n21
i 5 ðn21Þ=2
n21
i



1
2
n21
is the probability that at least ðn2 1Þ=2 other voters agree with him, in the event
that no trade has occurred.
Finally, if voter n deviates and demands ½ðn2 1Þ=22 g votes, his expected util-
ity is
U n
n21
2
2 g
 
5
2
n11
fnðg Þ1 n2 1
2ðn11Þ
 
u vn2
n21
2
2 g
 
p
 
1
2
n11
½12fnðg Þ1 n21
2ðn11Þ
 
u 2
n21
2
2 g
 
p
 
;
where again
fnðg Þ5 o
½ðn21Þ=21g
i ≥g
n2 1
2
1g
i
!


1
2
½ðn21Þ=21g 
is the probability that at least g other voters agree with him when voter n2 1has
offered his vote for sale and ½ðn21Þ=21 g voters in all retain their vote.
All three expected utilities are continuous in p; U nððn2 1Þ=2Þ and U nððn2
1Þ=22 g Þ are everywhere strictly decreasing in p andU nð2 1Þ is everywhere strictly
increasing in p. Notice that at p50 (and thus vn2150),
U n
n2 1
2
 j
p50
> U nð2 1Þj
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because fnððn21Þ=2Þ< 1, and
TABLE A1
Possible Outcomes and Their Probabilities
Offer Demand ðn21Þ=2 Votes
Outcome Probability Outcome Probability
0 ð12 dÞ=2 0 ð12lÞ=2
p 12 d
vi ð12 dÞ=2 vi2 ½ðn21Þ=2p l
vi1 p 12 d vi ð12lÞ=2
642 journal of political economyU n
n21
2
 j
p 5 0
> U n
n21
2
2 g
 j
p50
becauseU nððn2 1Þ=22 g Þjp50 is increasing in fnðg Þ and fnðg Þ is maximal at g 50.
Thus for any vn,U nððn2 1Þ=2Þ> U nð21Þ andU nððn2 1Þ=2Þ> U nððn21Þ=22 g Þ if
vn21 (and thus p) is sufficiently low. Equivalently, there must exist a number m′n
such that if vn ≥ m′nvn21, U nððn21Þ=2Þ> U nð2 1Þ and U nððn2 1Þ=2Þ> U nððn2
1Þ=22 g Þ. This is the condition identified in the proposition.
Voters 1, 2, . . . , n2 2: As in lemma 1, for voter i ∈ f1; : : :; n2 2g, deviation can
be profitable only if the voter demands ½ðn21Þ=22 1 or ðn2 1Þ=2 votes.
1. Consider first deviation to demanding ðn2 1Þ=2 votes. If n> 3, the possible
outcomes and their probabilities are represented in table A1, where we define
d5
1
n11
1
ðn2 1Þ2
2ðn11Þðn22Þ
and l5 ðn1 2Þ=3ðn1 1Þ. Thus
U ið21Þ> U i n21
2
 
⇔
d  ½uðpÞ1uðvi1pÞ ≥ 2l  u vi2n212 p
 
1 ðd2lÞ  ½uðviÞ1uð0Þ:
ðA10Þ
Note that vi ≤ vn21. At vi 5 vn21, given equation (A9), the fact that uð  Þ is increas-
ing, and the fact that d> l, equation (A10) holds with strict inequality. We can
show that if equation (A10) holds at vi 5 vn21, it must hold at all vi < vn21. Denote
D5 d  ½uðpÞ1uðvi1pÞ2 2l  u vi2n2 12 p
 
2 ðd2lÞ  ½uðviÞ1uð0Þ:This content downloaded  on Thu, 13 Dec 2012 11:28:06 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Then
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∂vi
5 d  ½u′ðvi1pÞ2u′ðviÞ2l
 2  u′ vi2n212 p
 
2u′ðviÞ
 
:
But the concavity of u then implies ∂D=∂vi < 0, and the result is established.
If n5 3, selling is preferred to buying one vote if 2uðpÞ1 2uðvi1 pÞ ≥
3uðviÞ1 ð0Þ. Note first that because 2u′ðvi1 pÞ23u′ðviÞ< 0 by concavity, we
need only to check the condition at vi 5 vn21. Using the specific functional form
of CARA utility simplifies the rest of the proof. Recall that the price is given by
p5
1
2r
ln
11e rvn21
2
 
:
Hence,
e2rp5
2
11e rvn21
 1=2
and
e 2rðv1pÞ5
2
11e rvn21
 1=2
e2rv:
The inequality that we need to verify reduces to
2
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p ð11e rvn21Þ1=2 ≤ e rvn2113:
Define x511 e rvn21 . Then, we want to show that 2
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p ﬃﬃﬃ
x
p
≤ 21 x. But 21 x2
2
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p ﬃﬃﬃ
x
p
has a minimum at x5 2, which is zero. Hence, the condition is always sat-
isfied.
2. We now show that if n> 3, selling one’s vote dominates demanding ðn23Þ=2
votes. If n> 3, the difference of utilities is given by
U ið21Þ2U i n23
2
 
5 2
n22 6n111
12ðn11Þðn2 2Þ½uðviÞ1uð0Þ
1
n223
4ðn11Þðn22Þ½uðpÞ1uðvi1pÞ
2
n21
3ðn11Þ

1
2
ðn11Þ=2 
u 2
n2 3
2
p
 
2
n21
3ðn11Þ

12

1
2
ðn11Þ=2 
u vi2
n23
2
p
 
2
1
n11
u vi2
n2 3
2
p
 
1u 2
n23
2
p
  
:
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It is somewhat cumbersome but not difficult to show that the expression is
decreasing in v.32 Hence it is minimal at vi 5 vn21; if (A11) is positive, then it is
644 journal of political economypositive for all vi ≤ vn21. Again, we make use of the CARA functional form. Define
m5 ð11 e rvn21Þ=2 so that p5 ½2=ðn1 1ÞrlnðmÞ. Thus
e2rp5m22=ðn11Þ; e2rðv1pÞ5 e2rvm22=ðn11Þ;
e r½ðn23Þ=2p5mðn23Þ=ðn11Þ; e2rfv2½ðn23Þ=2pg5 e2rvmðn23Þ=ðn11Þ:
Substituting in equation (A11), we can write
e rvn21 U kð21Þ2U k n23
2
  
5
n22 6n111
12ðn11Þðn2 2Þð11e
rvn21Þ
2
n22 3
4ðn11Þðn2 2Þm
22=ðn11Þð11e rvn21Þ
1
n21
3ðn11Þ

1
2
ðn11Þ=2 
e rvn21mðn23Þ=ðn11Þ
1
n21
3ðn11Þ 12

1
2
ðn11Þ=2  
mðn23Þ=ðn11Þ
1
1
n11
mðn23Þ=ðn11Þð11e rvn21Þ:
First, because e rvn 2 1 ≥ 1, it is sufficient to show that
G5
n226n111
12ðn11Þðn22Þð11e
rvn21Þ2 n
223
4ðn11Þðn2 2Þm
22=ðn11Þð11e rvn 2 1Þ
1
n21
3ðn11Þm
ðn23Þ=ðn11Þ1
1
n11
mðn23Þ=ðn11Þð11e rvn 2 1Þ
is positive. Note that 11 e rvn21 52m. Hence, we can write
G5
mðn23Þ=ðn11Þ
n11
n226n111
6ðn2 2Þ m
4=ðn11Þ2
n223
2ðn22Þm
2=ðn11Þ1
n21
3
12m
 
:
Denote
G5
n226n111
6ðn22Þ m
4=ðn11Þ2
n223
2ðn22Þm
2=ðn11Þ1
n21
3
12m:
32 The proof is available on request.This content downloaded  on Thu, 13 Dec 2012 11:28:06 AM
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We want to show that G ≥ 0.
Note that
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∂m
52
n226n111
3ðn11Þðn22Þ
 
mð32nÞ=ðn11Þ2
n22 3
ðn11Þðn2 2Þm
ð12nÞ=ðn11Þ12;
∂2G
∂m2
52
ð32nÞðn226n111Þ
3ðn11Þ2ðn22Þ
 
m2ð12nÞ=ðn11Þ2
ð12nÞðn223Þ
ðn11Þ2ðn22Þm
22n=ðn11Þ:
Therefore,
∂2G
∂m2
≥ 0⇔2ðn22 6n111Þm2=ðn11Þ ≤ 3ðn21Þðn13Þ
⇔m ≤ m*5
3ðn2 1Þðn13Þ
2ðn226n111Þ
 ðn11Þ=2
ð> 1Þ:
Note that by construction, m ∈ [1,1`]. Hence, ∂G=∂m has a maximum atm*. But
∂G
∂m
j
m51
5
5n2218n119
3ðn11Þðn22Þ;
which is always positive for n ≥ 3. Moreover, as m→`, we can see that for n> 3,
lim m→`
∂G
∂m
52> 0:
Therefore, ∂G=∂m ≥ 0 for any n and r. Hence, we need to show only that atm51,
G ≥ 0. But Gjm5150. Thus G ≥ 0, which implies G ≥ 0, which implies U kð21Þ2
U kððn23Þ=2Þ ≥ 0, concluding the proof for n> 3.
Finally, we need to show that demanding ðn2 3Þ=2 is also dominated when
n5 3, a condition that amounts to showing 3uðv1 pÞ2 4uðvÞ 22uð0Þ1 3uðpÞ
≥ 0. But 3u′ðv1 pÞ24u′ðvÞ ≤ 0, and thusweneed to check only the inequality at
v5 vn21. Redefining m5 ð11 e rvn21Þ=2, the condition becomes 26m1 2 ﬃﬃﬃﬃmp 1
4m
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
m
p
≥ 0. The right-hand side is increasing in m and is zero at m51. Hence, it
is always satisfied. QED
As in lemma 1, the equilibrium in which voter n always demands a majority of
votes is supported if there is a sufficient gap between vn and vn21. The required
gap is small: figure A1 shows the minimum required gap with CARA utility for the
two cases of r51 (the dashed line) and r52 (the dotted line), and as reference
for risk neutrality (the solid line), as a function of n. The minimum gap is always
smaller than 1 percent if r5 1 and smaller than 0.5 percent if r5 2 and disap-
pears asymptotically as n increases. Using a grid of size 0.001, we have verified nu-This content downloaded  on Thu, 13 Dec 2012 11:28:06 AM
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merically that the condition is satisfied by our experimental parameters for all r ∈
(0, 1,000]. The proposition then follows. QED
FIG. A1.—Minimum percentage gap with risk neutrality and with CARA utility function:
uðxÞ52e2rx , with r51 and r52.
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Alternative Rationing Rule (R2)
The rationing rule is part of an ex ante competitive equilibrium. We show here that
the analysis has some robustness to the choice of rationing rule. While we cannot
consider every possible rule, here we discuss one that we think is the most obvious
alternative among anonymous rules that do not exploit information that is private
to the voters (such as valuations or direction of preference). Consider the follow-
ing rule, which we call rationing by vote, or R2: if voters’ orders result in excess de-
mand, any vote supplied is randomly allocated to one of the individuals with out-
standing purchasing orders, with equal probability. An order remains outstanding
until it has been completely filled. When all supply is allocated, each individual
who put in an order must purchase all units that have been directed to him, even
if the order is only partially filled. If there is excess supply, the votes to be sold are
chosen randomly from each seller, with equal probability.
Contrary to rationing by voter, or R1, R2 guarantees that the short side of the
market is never rationed but forces individuals to accept partially filled orders.
The two rationing rules have both strong and weak points. For our purposes, the
important result is that they support equilibria with very similar structures.We can
show the following proposition.This content downloaded  on Thu, 13 Dec 2012 11:28:06 AM
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Proposition 4. Suppose that hi 5
1
2, wi 5 1, andmi 50 for all i; agents are risk
neutral; and R2 is the rationing rule. Voters are ordered according to increasing
competitive equilibrium in markets for votes 647valuation: v1 < v2 <   < vn. Then there exist n¯ and a finite threshold kðnÞ ≥ 1
such that, for all n ≤ n¯ and vn21 ≥ kðnÞvn22, the following set of price and actions
constitute an ex ante competitive equilibrium:
1. Price p*5 vn21=2ðn21Þ.
2. Voters 1 to n2 2 offer to sell their vote with probability one.
3. Voter n demands ðn21Þ=2 votes with probability one.
4. Voter n21 offers his vote with probability 2=ðn1 1Þ and demands ðn21Þ=2
votes with probability ðn21Þ=ðn1 1Þ.
Proof. If n5 3, in equilibrium R2 is identical to R1, and lemma 1 applies here
immediately. The proof considers n> 3.
Voter n21: In the candidate equilibrium, voter n21 has expected utility
U n21ð21Þ5 1=2ðp1 vn21=2Þ1 1=2ðvn21=2Þ5 vn21=21 p=2. (a) Demanding a num-
ber of votes x ∈ ð0; ðn21Þ=2Þ cannot be a profitable deviation. Any such demand
is satisfied with probability one, causing an expenditure of px > 0 while leaving
the probability of obtaining the desired outcome at one-half and thus results in
expected utility U n21ðxÞ5 vn21=22 px. (b) Demanding more than ðn21Þ=2 votes
cannot be a profitable deviation: as long as voter n21 has received fewer than
ðn21Þ=2 votes, n21’s order is outstanding whether his demand is ðn2 1Þ=2 or
higher, and thus the deviation does not affect the probability of individual n being
rationed; once voter n21 has received ðn2 1Þ=2 votes, he controls the final out-
come, and any further expenditure is wasted. (c) Finally, doing nothing (U n21ð0Þ
5 vn21=2) is dominated by offering to sell.
Voter n: (a) Doingnothing is again dominated by selling: it is identical to selling
if n2 1 sells, and it is strictly dominated if n21 buys. (b) Selling is dominated by
demanding ðn21Þ=2 votes. If n21 offers to buy, then nmust prefer demanding
ðn21Þ=2 to selling because in the identical circumstance n21, with smaller val-
uation, is indifferent between the two options. If n2 1 offers to sell, again nmust
prefer to buy ðn21Þ=2: when n2 1 sells, buying yields expected utility vn2
ðn21Þp=2, while offering to sell means that no trade takes place (all voters try to
sell) and n wins with probability
fn
n2 1
2
 
; o
n21
k5ðn21Þ=2
n21
k

1
2
n21
;

the probability that at least ðn21Þ=2 of the other voters agree with him. But fn is
declining in n and thus is maximal at n53, where it equals 34. Hence when n21
sells, n’s expected utility from offering to sell has upper bound 34 vn . But vn 2
ðn21Þp=25 vn2 vn21=4> 34vn for all vn > vn21. Hence the only deviation to consider
is demanding a quantity of votes x different from ðn2 1Þ=2. (c) Demanding a
quantity x larger than ðn21Þ=2 cannot be profitable. If voter n2 1 is selling, the
order will be filled and is less profitable than demanding ðn21Þ=2; if voter n21This content downloaded  on Thu, 13 Dec 2012 11:28:06 AM
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is buying, the argument is identical to point 1b above. (d ) Demanding a quan-
tity x smaller than ðn2 1Þ=2 is not a profitable deviation either. In the candidate
648 journal of political economyequilibrium, n has expected utility equal to
U n
n2 1
2
 
5
2
n11
 
vn2 p
n21
2
 
1
n21
n11
 
1
2
vn
2
2 p
n23
2
 
1
1
2
vn2 p
n21
2
  
5
vnð513nÞ2nvn21
4ðn11Þ ;
where the second expression is obtained by substituting for p. If n offers to buy
x < ðn21Þ=2, his demand is always satisfied. His expected utility is vn=22 px if
n2 1 is buying and hðxÞvn2 px if n2 1 is offering to sell, where
hðxÞ; o
n212x
k 5 ðn21Þ=22x
n212 x
k

1
2
n212x
is the probability that n obtains his preferred outcome when owning x1 1
votes (while everyone else has one vote). Thus
U nðxÞ5 2
n11
 
½hðxÞvn2 px1 n2 1n11
 
vn
2
2 px
 
:
With x < ðn2 1Þ=2, the difference U nððn2 1Þ=2Þ2U nðxÞ is minimal when p is
highest, that is, when vn215 vn . But
U n
n21
2
 j
vn21 5 vn
5
512n
4ðn11Þ;
U nðxÞjvn21 5 vn 5
1
2
n2 114hðxÞ
n11
2
x
n21
 
:
It then follows immediately that
U n
n21
2
 j
vn215vn
> U nðxÞjvn215vn
for all x> 0 and all hðxÞ ≤ 1. HenceU nððn21Þ=2Þ> U nðxÞ: deviation is not advan-
tageous.
Voters 1, 2, . . . , n22: (a) One possible deviation is for voter i ∈ f1; : : : ;
n2 2g to do nothing. When voter n2 1 demands ðn2 1Þ=2 votes, supply is n23
and it is then not possible for either n2 1 or n to be dictator. Call reðnÞ the prob-This content downloaded  on Thu, 13 Dec 2012 11:28:06 AM
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ability that votes supplied are allocated equally to n and n21 when n21 de-
mands ðn21Þ=2 votes. That is,
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n23
ðn23Þ=2

1
2
 n23
:

ðB1Þ
Then i ’s expected utility from doing nothing, U 0i , is given by
U ið0Þ5 2
n11
vi
2
 
1
n2 1
n11
½12 reðnÞvi2 1 reðnÞ
3
4
vi
 
: ðB2Þ
Voter i ’s expected utility from selling, U ið21Þ, is
U ið21Þ5 2
n11
vi
2
1
p
2
 
1
n2 1
n11
vi
2
1p
 
: ðB3Þ
Comparing (B2) to (B3) and substituting (B1), we derive
U ið21Þ ≥ U ið0Þ⇔
vn21
vi
≥
ðn2 1Þ2
n
n23
ðn23Þ=2

1
2
 n22
:
 ðB4Þ
The right-hand side of equation (B4) is smaller than one for all n < 9 and equals
10=9 at n5 9. Thus deviation to doing nothing is never advantageous for any i at
n5 5 or 7; at n59, we need to impose vn21 ≥ ð10=9Þvn22. It will be shown below
that this is not the binding restriction. However,
lim
n→`
ðn21Þ2
n
n2 3
ðn2 3Þ=2

1
2
 n22
5`:

Thus unless vi 50 for all i < n2 1, there must always exist a number n¯ such that,
for all n> n¯, voter n22 prefers to do nothing than to sell. The actions and price
described in the proposition can be an equilibrium only for n ≤ n¯.
(b) The other possible deviation for voter i is demanding a positive num-
ber of votes x, with x ∈ f1; 2; : : :; ðn21Þ=2g. As before, demanding more than
ðn21Þ=2 votes is never advantageous. Consider first i ’s expected utility from de-
manding ðn2 1Þ=2 votes. Call diðn; xn21Þ the probability that i becomes the dic-
tator, that is, the probability that he obtains ðn2 1Þ=2 votes, as a function of n and
of voter n21’s demand, xn21. When n21 demands ðn21Þ=2 votes, the total sup-This content downloaded  on Thu, 13 Dec 2012 11:28:06 AM
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ply of votes is n2 3, and diðn; ðn2 1Þ=2Þ is the probability that at least ðn2 1Þ=2
votes are randomly allocated to voter i:
650 journal of political economydi n;
n21
2
 
5 o
n23
i5ðn21Þ=2
o
n232i
z50
ðn2 3Þ!
i!z!ðn232 z2 iÞ!
1
3
 n23
:
Similarly, d2 iðn; ðn21Þ=2Þ is the probability that either n or n2 1 becomes dic-
tator, that is, the probability that at least ðn2 1Þ=2 votes are randomly allocated to
one of them:
d2i n;
n21
2
 
5 2 o
n23
z5ðn21Þ=2
o
n2 32z
y50
ðn2 3Þ!
z!y!ðn232 z2 yÞ!
1
3
 n23
:
Thus i ’s expected utility when n21 demands ðn21Þ=2 votes, either n or n21
becomes dictator, and i demands xi 5 ðn21Þ=2 votes is given by
Z idð2iÞ
n21
2
 
5 2 o
n23
z5ðn21Þ=2
o
n2 32z
y50
ðn2 3Þ!
z!y!ðn232 z2 yÞ!
1
3
 n23
 v
2
2 p n232 z2 y1 o
z2ðn21Þ=2
i51
z2 ðn21Þ=2
i

i
1
2
 z2ðn21Þ=2  
:

Finally, there is the probability that no dictator arises:
12 di2 d2i5 o
ðn23Þ=2
z50
o
ðn23Þ=2
y5ðn23Þ=22z
ðn2 3Þ!
z!y!ðn232 z2 yÞ!
1
3
 n23
and the corresponding expected utility
Z inod
n21
2
 
5 o
ðn23Þ=2
z50
o
ðn23Þ=2
y5ðn23Þ=22z
ðn23Þ!
z!y!ðn2 32 z2 yÞ!
 1
3
 n23 3v
4
2 pðn232 z2 yÞ
 
:
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:
Comparing U iððn21Þ=2Þ to i ’s expected utility from selling, and substituting
p, we find that U ið21Þ ≥ U iððn21Þ=2Þ for all i <n21 if and only if vn21 ≥
ð25=24Þvn22 if n55, vn21 ≥ ð11=10Þvn22 if n57, and vn21 ≥ 1:15vn22 if n59.
(c) For n> 3, demanding less than ðn21Þ=2 votes can in principle be advanta-
geous if n21 demands ðn21Þ=2 votes and neither n21 nor n emerges as dicta-
tor. The calculations are somewhat cumbersome but follow the logic just de-
scribed, and we do not report them here (they are available from the authors
on demand). They show the following: (1) For all i, U ið21Þ ≥ U iððn23Þ=2Þ
as long as vn21 ≥ vn22, satisfied by definition. For n55, this concludes the proof.
(2) For all i, U ið2 1Þ ≥ U iððn2 5Þ=2Þ as long as vn21 ≥ vn22, satisfied by defini-
tion. For n57, this completes the proof. (3) For n5 9, U ið2 1Þ ≥ U iððn27Þ= 2Þ
for all i as long as vn21 ≥ 1:04vn22. The condition is not binding because vn21 ≥
1:15vn22 is required to prevent n22 to deviate to doing nothing.
Summarizing the conditions derived in points a, b, and c, we conclude that the
actions and price described in the proposition are an equilibrium for n55 if
and only if vn21 ≥ ð25=24Þvn22; for n5 7, if and only if vn21 ≥ ð11=10Þvn22; and for
n5 9, if and only if vn21 ≥ 1:15vn22. With 1:15> 11=10> 25=24, the latter condi-
tion is sufficient for n ∈ f3; 5; 7; 9g and necessary and sufficient for n5 9. This is
the statement in the proposition. QED
In particular, parts 1–4 constitute an equilibrium if n ≤ 9 and vn21 ≥ 1:15vn22,
conditions satisfied in our experimental treatments. Note that with risk neutrality
the constraint mi 50 for all i is again irrelevant and is imposed for simplicity of
notation only.
The equilibrium is almost identical to the equilibrium with R1 in which the
highest-valuation voter demands ðn2 1Þ=2 votes with probability one, with two
differences. First, because orders can be filled partially, rationing can be particu-
larly costly. In equilibrium, if voter n21 attempts to buy, either he or voter n will
be required to pay for votes that are strictly useless (since the other voter will hold
a majority stake). To support voter n21’s mixed strategy, if there are more
than three voters, the equilibrium price is lower than with the original ration-
ing rule: vn21=2ðn21Þ instead of vn21=ðn1 1Þ. And because the price is lower,
voter n always demands a majority of votes: the small wedge between vn5 vn21
that with R1 is required to prevent voter n from selling his vote with positive prob-
ability now disappears. Second, and again because of the possibility of filling par-
tial orders, lower-valuation voters can use their ownorders strategically, refraining
from selling to increase the probability that no dictator emerges. To rule out the
possibility of such a deviation, the price must be high enough relative to their val-
uation. This is the reason for requiring vn21 ≥ kðnÞvn22.This content downloaded  on Thu, 13 Dec 2012 11:28:06 AM
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With these two caveats, the change in rationing rule has little effect. In partic-
ular, equilibrium vote trading results in dictatorship, and the welfare implications
652 journal of political economyare similar.
Appendix C
Price Regression
TABLE C1
Linear Regression of the Log of the Transacted Price on a Market Dummy and
the Inverse of the Time, in Seconds, since the Beginning of Each Match
Linear Regression: logðpMmtÞ5aM1 bMmð1=tÞ1 εMmt
Parameter n55 n59 Parameter n55 n59
aHB 2.0375 2.0238 bLT,match0 227.04 82.47*aLTaLB
bHT,
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s(43.03)
2.403
(.293)2.344
(.232)79.89**
(36.35)15.73*
(8.223)2.729* 2.391** bLT,match2 12.60 8.206*
(.437) (.189) (11.78) (4.252)match0 58.52** 44.25** bLT,match3 2156.9** 5.706
(26.79) (19.81) (80.07) (5.648)match1 34.38* 4.058 bLB,match0 9.444 236.43*
(20.00) (3.969) (11.42) (19.79)match2 3.829 2.493 bLB,match1 35.85 29.49*
(10.24) (2.208) (35.38) (17.03)match3 25.769** 2.833 bLB,match2 210.35 11.14
(2.647) (2.068) (7.691) (9.667)match0 74.08** 41.52** bLB,match3 43.35* 6.629
(33.62) (19.05) (22.96) (8.737)match1 24.697** 24.78** Constant 5.490*** 5.304***
(2.244) (11.64) (.175) (.147)match2 259.36* 2.486* Observations 178 435
(31.80) (1.348)2
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on and match.clusters, the sta s a through a cluster-robust bootstrap estimator, with
2,000 repetitions (Cameron et al. 2008). The regression does not include four price realiza-
tions just above zero that were observed after a dictator had emerged. Standard errors are in
parentheses.
* p < .1.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.
Appendix DThank you for agreeing to participate in this decision making experiment. Dur-
ing the experiment we require your complete, undistracted attention, and ask
that you follow instructions carefully. You may not open other applications on
your computer, chat with other students, or engage in other distracting activities,
such as using your phone, reading books, etc.
You will be paid for your participation in cash, at the end of the experiment.
Different participants may earn different amounts. What you earn depends partly
competitive equilibrium in markets for votes 653on your decisions, partly on the decisions of others, and partly on chance.
The entire experiment will take place through computer terminals, and all in-
teraction between you will take place through the computers. It is important that
you not talk or in any way try to communicate with other participants during the
experiments.
During the instruction period, you will be given a complete description of the
experiment and will be shown how to use the computers. If you have any ques-
tions during the instruction period, raise your hand and your question will be an-
swered out loud so everyone can hear. If you have any questions after the exper-
iment has begun, raise your hand, and an experimenter will come and assist you.
Theexperiment you are participating in is a committee voting experiment, where
you will have an opportunity to buy and sell votes before voting on an outcome.
At the end of the experiment you will be paid the sumof what you have earned,
plus a show-up fee of $10.00. Everyone will be paid in private and you are under
no obligation to tell others how much you earned. Your earnings during the ex-
periment are denominated in POINTS. Your DOLLAR earnings are determined
by dividing your earnings in POINTS by 350, that is, for every 350 POINTS you
get 1 DOLLAR.
In this experiment you will be in a 5 member committee to decide on an out-
come, X or Y. Each of you will be randomly assigned with probability 1/2 to be
either in favor of X or in favor of Y. You will be told which outcome you favor, but
will not be told the outcome favored by anyone else. You will also be assigned a
Value, which you will earn if and only if your preferred outcome is the committee
decision. If the opposite outcome is the committee decision you do not earn your
value. Values will be different for different members. All values are integers be-
tween 1 and 1,000 points.
Committee decisions are made by majority rule. Outcome X is the committee
decision if there are more votes for X than for Y and vice versa.
Every round consists of two stages. Each committee member starts the round
with one vote. After being told your value, but before voting, there will be a
2-minute trading stage, during which you and the other members of your com-
mittee will have an opportunity to buy or sell votes. We will describe how trading
occurs momentarily.
After the trading stage ends, we proceed to the voting stage. In this stage you do
not really have any choice. Youwill simply be asked to click a button to cast all your
votes, if you have any, for your preferred outcome.
We will repeat this procedure for a set of 5 rounds, each consisting of the same
two stages, trading and voting, described above. This set of five rounds is called a
match. During each round of the match each of you will keep the same Value you
were assigned in round 1 of thematch, but you will be randomly assigned to be in
favor of X or Y (with each equally likely). Therefore, your preferred outcome can
change from round to round. At the end of the fifth round of thematch, a second
match of 5 rounds will begin. In this new match, you will be assigned a different
Value, which you will keep for each of the 5 rounds in the second match. The
experiment consists of 4 matches of 5 rounds each. [SCREEN 1] When we begin
the experiment, you will see a screen like this. Your Subject ID# is printed atThis content downloaded  on Thu, 13 Dec 2012 11:28:06 AM
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the very top left of your screen, and remains the same throughout the whole
experiment.
654 journal of political economyThe currentmatch number, roundnumber, your value, and your preferred out-
come are displayed below your subject ID in the left part of the screen. The
match number and round number are both equal to 1 now, indicating that this
is the first election in your committee. Notice that this is an example where mem-
ber 3’s preferred outcome is X andhis value 13. The committee number will iden-
tify you during the trading stage and will be the same for the different rounds of a
same match, and different between matches.
Themiddle panel is the trading window. Just above the panel, there is your cash
holdings. At the beginning of the experiment, you will be loaned an initial
amount of cash of 10,000 points, which will not be included in your final earnings.
In the right part of the panel there is a table that clarifies how many votes each
member of the committee currently has. Your information is highlighted and the
other members’ information is not. Notice that you do not see the values of the
other members.
As the experiment proceeds, your cash holdings will be updated to reflect any
earnings youmake. It increases when you sell votes or when you earn your value as
a result of the voting. It decreases when you buy votes. At the top of the panel,
there is a countdown timer that tells you how much time is left in the trading pe-
riod. The timer will turn red when there are 10 seconds left in the trading period,
as you can see in the screen. There is a history panel in the lower part of the screen
whichwill keep track of the history of the current and all past rounds andmatches.
Trading occurs in the following way. At any time during this trading period, any
member may post a bid to buy or an offer to sell one or multiple votes. At the bot-
tom of themiddle trading panel there is an area where you can type in your bid or
your offer.When you do so, it will look like this: [SCREEN2, 999 entered] You also
have to choose the amount of units you want to buy or sell. [SCREEN 3] Your bids
or offersmust always be between 1 and 1,000. After you type in a price and a quan-
tity, click the “bid” or “offer” button just to the right, and your bid or offer (price
and quantity) will be posted on the trading board on the computer screens of all
committee members, as you can see in this screen. [SCREEN 4] In this case, the
column Bidder ID indicates that the member who made the bid was member 3;
the bid price indicates that the price is 999. In the Bidder’s Fulfilled columns you
can see two numbers: the one on the right indicates the number of units he bid
for, and the first number indicates the number of partial acceptances. In our ex-
ample, he made a bid for one unit and nobody accepted so far. Whenever a new
bid or offer is entered, it is added to the board and does not cancel any outstand-
ing bids or offer if there are any. When other members make bids or offers, you
will also see the additions to the table as you can see now in the screen. [SCREEN 5]
In this case member 2 made an offer for 201 for one unit, and member 1 made
a bid for two units at price 3 (the price indicates the price paid per unit). All mem-
bers in your committee see this information. The numbers on this slide are for
illustration only.
If anothermemberhas an active bid or offer, then youmay accept it. In order to
accept a bid or an offer you just have to click on it and it will become highlighted
in yellow. [SCREEN 6] In this case member 3 clicked the offer. At that point, aThis content downloaded  on Thu, 13 Dec 2012 11:28:06 AM
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button below the table becomes active. If there is only one unit to be transacted, as
in this case, by clicking the button the unit will be transacted and the transaction
competitive equilibrium in markets for votes 655is highlighted in green. [SCREEN 7]
If you accept an offer, as in this case, you will have an extra vote, and in ex-
change you will pay the other member the price of his offer. This information is
immediately updated on your screens. See that the table on the right has been
updated: now member 3 has 2 votes and member 2 has none and the cash hold-
ings have also been updated. Similarly, if you have an active offer for exactly one
unit, and anothermember accepts it, he will own your vote and he will pay you the
amount of your offer. The same goes for bids that are accepted, except the trans-
action is a buy, by the person who posted the bid, rather than a sell. It’s very im-
portant to remember that you post a bid if you want to buy and post an offer if you
want to sell!
If you accept a bid or offer and the order is for more than one unit, the trans-
action does not take place until the whole order has been filled. Thus, if someone
submitted a bid to buy two votes and you accept their bid, nothing happens yet
because their order has not yet been filled. [SCREEN 8] As you can see now, some
member accepted member 1’s bid. It will be filled only after a second acceptance
has been made, at which time both transactions will be executed simultaneously
and the transaction is highlighted in green. [SCREEN 9]
If you have an active bid or offer that has not been transacted, you can cancel it.
To do so, you need to click on it. [SCREEN 10] By doing so, the bid or offer will be
highlighted in yellow and the cancel button will become active. Clicking the can-
cel button will cancel the bid or offer that you clicked on. It will then disappear
from the screen. [SCREEN 11] If you have accepted a bid or offer for multiple
units which has not been transacted, you can also cancel your partial acceptance.
In that case, the bid or offer will remain in the screen but the number of partial
acceptances will be updated. You may also cancel all your untransacted market
activities at any time by clicking the “Cancel All” button, located on the right hand
side of the panel, below the table. See that, as the remaining time is less than 10 sec-
onds, the remaining time is red.
The trading period ends after 2minutes. There are two additional trading rules.
First, if your cash holdings ever become 0or negative, youmaynot place any bid or
accept any offer until it becomes positive again. Second, you may not sell votes
if you do not have any or if all the votes you currently own are committed.
After 2 minutes, the trading stage of the round is over and we proceed to the
voting stage. Your screenwould now look like [SCREEN12]. At this stage, you sim-
ply cast your votes by clicking on the vote button. These votes are automatically
cast as votes for X if your preferred outcome is X and are automatically cast as
votes for Y if your preferred outcome is Y.
After you and the othermembers of the committee have voted, the results are dis-
played in the right hand panel and summarized in the history screen. [SCREEN 13]
We will then proceed to the next round. [SCREEN 14] In the next round, as you
can see in the right table, all members’ votes will be reinitialized to one and your
preferred outcome will be randomly assigned. Because this round belongs to the
same match, you will be able to see the bids, offers, and transactions of the previ-
ous rounds of the same match. [SCREEN 15]This content downloaded  on Thu, 13 Dec 2012 11:28:06 AM
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